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Paul A. Volcker 
James Tobin 
1.  Michael Mussa 
U.S. Monetary Policy in the 1980s 
The story of  U.S. monetary policy in the  1980s is fundamentally a tale of 
struggle and success, after a decade during which monetary policy contributed 
significantly to the poor performance of the US. economy. At the beginning 
of the 1980s, a great battle was waged against the demon of inflation that had 
damaged and distorted the US. economy since the late 1960s-a  battle that 
was made necessary by the policies that nurtured the demon of inflation during 
the preceding fifteen years, especially during the late 1970s. In the recessions 
of  1980 and 1981-82,  casualties from the battle ran high, with the unemploy- 
ment rate rising to a postwar peak of  10.8 percent. In some areas, such as the 
savings and loan industry, the dead are still being counted, and the bill for their 
funerals is yet to be fully reckoned and paid. Nevertheless, despite the high 
costs of battle, a substantial and necessary victory over inflation was won in 
the early 1980s, and this success was sustained throughout the remainder of 
the decade. 
Indeed, by the end of 1989, the economic expansion that began in November 
1982 was already two years longer than any previous peacetime U.S. expan- 
sion. Real GNP had risen at a 4 percent annual rate from the recession trough 
and at a 3 percent annual rate from the preceding business-cycle peak. The 
unemployment rate had fallen to the lowest level since the early 1970s. Except 
for a temporary decline that was due to a fall in oil prices in 1986, the inflation 
rate ran at a steady rate close to 4 percent for the eight-year period beginning 
in December 1981. Judged by the objectives of the Employment Act of 1946- 
“maximum employment, production, and purchasing power”-the  U.S. econ- 
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omy performed quite well after the costly victory over inflation in 1981-82, 
especially in comparison with its performance during the preceding decade. 
Of course, economic performance was not solely determined by economic 
policy, and monetary policy was not the only policy to influence that perfor- 
mance significantly. Moreover, some aspects of  U.S. economic performance 
and policy were not entirely satisfactory  during the 198Os, including the persis- 
tence of  relatively large budget and trade deficits and the failure to reduce 
inflation below a 4 percent annual rate. Nevertheless, an overall assessment of 
U.S.  macroeconomic policy in the 1980s, in terms of the basic objectives of 
supporting sustainable growth while maintaining reasonable price stability, 
must be fundamentally favorable. The task of this essay is to analyze the sig- 
nificant contributions  of monetary policy both to the macroeconomic  problems 
confronting the U.S. economy at the beginning of the 1980s and to the gener- 
ally successful record of dealing with those problems. 
2.1  Assumptions and Qualifications 
Monetary policy differs from most other elements of economic policy in the 
United States because it is under the control of a single institution-the  Fed- 
eral Reserve System. The most important decisions about monetary policy are 
made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), consisting of the seven 
governors of the Federal Reserve System and, on a rotating basis, five of the 
presidents of the twelve regional Federal Reserve banks (always including the 
president of  the Federal Reserve Bank of New York). Since the members of 
the FOMC do not always share precisely the same views, the internal politics 
of the Federal Reserve occasionally have some importance for decisions about 
monetary policy. 
However, within the Federal Reserve, there is general agreement about the 
primary goals of monetary policy-sustainable  economic growth with low in- 
flation. On the FOMC and on the Board of Governors, the chairman is usually 
able to shape a consensus supporting the policy that he favors. Unlike tax pol- 
icy or expenditure policy or trade policy, authority over monetary policy is not 
divided between the legislative and the executive branches, with many power- 
ful individuals, agencies, and interests affecting the ultimate outcome. For de- 
cisions about monetary policy, economic effects rather than political conse- 
quences are usually the dominant concern. Accordingly, this essay focuses 
primarily on the economic developments that influenced the conduct of mone- 
tary policy during the 1980s and on the economic effects of that policy. 
Another important feature of monetary policy is that, like a military cam- 
paign, it is conducted on virtually a continual basis in real time. The FOMC 
meets about every six weeks to discuss the performance of the economy and 
to assess, and if necessary adjust, its monetary policy. In practice, the Federal 
Reserve tends to maintain the general stance of its policy-toward  tightness 
or ease-for  periods of many months. The analysis of monetary policy, there- 83  Monetary Policy 
fore, can conveniently be divided into major episodes corresponding to the 
main thrust of the Federal Reserve’s policy. However, within each major epi- 
sode, decisions are continually made to adjust (or not to adjust) the degree of 
tightness or ease of  monetary policy. The analysis of  monetary policy must 
also be concerned with the reasons for and consequences  of these adjustments. 
Because of the way  in which monetary policy is conducted, much of  this 
essay is devoted to a chronological description of the main developments in 
the U.S. economy and in U.S. monetary policy from the late 1970s through the 
1980s. This is combined with an effort to interpret the effects that monetary 
policy was having on the evolution of  the economy and to assess critically 
the conduct of that policy. The interpretative effort is based not on a formally 
specified, statistically estimated econometric model, but rather on a broad, in- 
tuitively based understanding of how monetary policy influences the behavior 
of the economy. Three important presumptions underlie this assessment of 
monetary policy and should be explicitly stated, These presumptions are not 
“truths” that have been rigorously established by economic theory or empirical 
research. They represent my views about how monetary policy operates in the 
US.  economy. They are widely shared by economic policymakers, especially 
at the Federal Reserve. 
First is a modified version of the classic dichotomy: monetary policy exerts 
considerable influence on the behavior of the general level of prices (or the 
inflation rate) over the medium term but has only limited capacity to influence 
the medium or longer term behavior of real output and employment. Second, 
in the shorter run of a year or two years, a tighter monetary policy that tends 
to reduce inflation will also usually tend to reduce temporarily the growth of 
output and employment; but it is an unstable monetary pplicy, contributing to 
high and volatile inflation and to wide swings of economic activity, that im- 
pairs real growth in the longer term of five to ten years. Third, in the very short 
term, given the state of the economy, a tighter monetary policy usually means 
both an increase in short-term interest rates, especially the Federal funds rate, 
and a reduction in the rates of growth of monetary aggregates. 
Several important qualifications should be noted to these general presump- 
tions. Once monetary policy has allowed substantial inflationary pressures to 
build up in the economy, a determined effort to reduce inflation through a 
tighter monetary policy may well reduce the average real growth rate looking 
forward even over a medium-term period of three or four years. The presump- 
tion, however, is that, if monetary policy had more effectively resisted the rise 
of inflationary pressures in the first place, real growth would have been better 
(or, at least, no worse) in the longer term. 
Monetary policy is not the only important factor influencing the behavior of 
the price level, especially in the short term. When the relative prices of some 
important commodities (such as oil) change suddenly and substantially, the 
general price level moves in the same direction, pretty much regardless of the 
stance of monetary policy. In the longer term, however, monetary policy can 84  Michael Mussa 
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effectively resist a persistent rise in the rate of inflation, even if it is not the 
only influence on the general price level. 
Monetary policy is also far from the only important factor that influences the 
course of economic activity. The general slowdown in the rate of real economic 
growth since the early 1970s, in the United States and other major industrial 
countries, is not  plausibly the  consequence of  monetary policy.  Even  for 
business-cycle fluctuations in economic activity (as illustrated in fig. 2.1 by 
deviations of real GNP from its smoothed trend path), many factors other than 
monetary policy played important roles.' These factors include fluctuations in 
government spending associated with the Korean and Vietnam wars, other im- 
portant fiscal policy actions of the U.S. government, the oil shocks and other 
commodity price disturbances of  the early and late 1970s, some exogenous 
fluctuations in consumption and investment spending, and some important 
shifts in U.S. real net exports related to movements in foreign economic activ- 
ity and in the foreign exchange value of  the dollar. Indeed, even exogenous 
fluctuations in the rate of productivity growth-the  central focus of  "real" 
1. The smoothed trend path of U.S. real GNP in fig. 2.1 is constructed by  using the Hodrick- 
Prescott filter, which allows for some gradual change in the trend rate of growth or real GNP. 
There is nothing sacred about this particular filter, but it does give a generally reasonable basis for 
measuring business-cycle deviations of real GNP from its trend behavior. I would argue, however, 
that the trend line is probably a little low during 1980-83.  The 1980 recession should push real 
GNP somewhat further below the trend line, and the 1981-82  recession should be reflected in a 
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business-cycle theories-probably  played some meaningful role in postwar 
U.S. business cycles. 
Monetary policy, however, was surely one important factor that influenced 
the course of economic activity during the recessions of  1957-58,  1960-61, 
1969-70,  1974-75, 1980, and  1981-82,  as well as during the growth slow- 
downs of  1966-67  and  1989-90.  Given the longer-term movements in the 
trend rate of real economic growth, monetary policy also influenced the spe- 
cific course of economic activity during postwar business-cycle expansions. 
Discerning the effects of  monetary policy on the price level and on eco- 
nomic activity is a difficult and somewhat imprecise task because these effects 
are not always stable from one episode to the next. Experience suggests that a 
tightening of monetary policy should be expected to slow real growth with 
a lag of a few months to a year or so and to slow the rate of inflation with a 
somewhat longer lag and conversely for an easing of monetary policy. How- 
ever, a good deal depends on the context in which a monetary policy action is 
taken and on the effect of that action on expectations. In a strongly growing 
economy, monetary tightening may have little short-term effect on real eco- 
nomic activity, while, in an already weak economy or in combination with 
other negative shocks, a sharp monetary tightening may rapidly induce an eco- 
nomic downturn. If economic agents are highly sensitive to the risks of rising 
inflation, and if the central bank lacks credibility for its anti-inflation policy, 
a relatively minor action to ease monetary policy may  stimulate a rapid and 
significant inflationary response. In contrast, if the monetary authority has es- 
tablished a high degree of credibility for its opposition to inflation, and if con- 
ditions in the economy are relatively slack, then even a substantial easing of 
monetary policy may take considerable time to generate significant inflation- 
ary results. 
The interpretation of what constitutes a tightening or an easing of monetary 
policy also can be a complex and sensitive matter. An action to raise the Fed- 
eral funds rate that would normally signify monetary tightening may not have 
this significance  if increases in inflationary expectations or other pressures on 
market-determined interest rates are pushing rates up faster than the action of 
the monetary authority. Conversely, a sharp slowdown in money growth that 
would  normally  indicate monetary  tightening (especially in  a  rapidly  ex- 
panding economy) may not have quite the same significance if economic activ- 
ity is falling in the initial stages of  a recession. More generally, it should be 
recognized that changes in monetary growth rates and in the Federal funds rate 
reflect both policy actions of the Federal Reserve and endogenous responses 
to other developments in the economy. 
With all these qualifications, it may be wondered whether it is possible to 
reach firm conclusions concerning the successes and failures of monetary pol- 
icy during the 1980s. On the several important issues, I believe that reasonably 
clear answers can be given. Fortunately, these answers do not require precise 
estimates of the effects of monetary policy, and of the effects of all other fac- 86  Michael Mussa 
tors, on the performance of the U.S. economy during the 1980s. Instead, it is 
a great advantage to assess the conduct of  monetary policy qualitatively, by 
examining whether an alternative course of monetary policy would plausibly 
have improved the performance of the U.S. economy and whether the Federal 
Reserve ought reasonably to have had the sense and judgment to pursue such 
an alternative policy. Inevitably, of  course, a significant degree of  ambiguity 
will always remain in any such effort to assess fairly the complex and difficult 
task of conducting monetary policy in the U.S. economy. 
2.2  Nurturing the Demon of Inflation 
To analyze the most important issue in the conduct of monetary policy dur- 
ing the 1980s-the  battle against and victory over high and volatile inflation- 
it is essential to review the development of the problem of inflation during the 
postwar era. 
2.2.1  The Rise of Inflation 
The inflation rate, measured by the annual rate of change in the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), remained quite low from the early 1950s through the mid- 
1960s. Indeed, in 1956, the Federal Reserve became concerned when the in- 
flation rate rose to 3 percent. The consequent tightening of monetary policy 
probably helped precipitate, deepen, or prolong the recession of 1957-58. 
After remaining at or below 2 percent through 1965, the inflation rate rose 
to 3.4 percent during 1966. Concerned with possible overheating of the econ- 
omy, the Federal Reserve tightened credit for about six months during 1966. 
There was a brief slowdown in economic growth in late 1966 and early 1967, 
but no recession. The inflation rate in  1967 leveled off at about 3 percent. 
However, with the resurgence of  economic growth beginning in the second 
half of 1967 and the deepening U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, the in- 
flation rate rose to 4.7 percent during 1968 and to 6.2 percent during 1969. 
Concern with high inflation brought a tightening of both monetary and fiscal 
policy beginning in late 1968-policy  actions that surely contributed to the 
recession that started in late 1969. In contrast to the 1950s, however, the infla- 
tion rate reached 6 percent before effective policy measures began to operate 
against the inflationary menace. 
Under the impact of rising unemployment and declining economic activity, 
the inflation rate (measured by the six-month annualized rate of change in the 
CPI) fell to 5.2 in late 1970 and continued down to about 3.5 percent during 
the first half of 1971. About six months into the recession, with evidence of no 
more than a partial victory over inflation, the Federal Reserve began to ease 
monetary policy fairly aggressively. Business activity began to expand in No- 
vember 1970. 
During the summer of  197 1, monthly inflation rates began to edge upward. 
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year and a half, these controls helped partially suppress a further rise of  the 
inflation rate, despite a relatively easy monetary policy. As  controls were 
phased out, however, the inflation rate began to rise. With the increase in world 
oil prices after the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, the twelve-month infla- 
tion rate was pushed to 8.7 percent for 1973 and to 12.3 percent for 1974- 
inflation rates well above the 6.2 percent rate at the end of the long economic 
expansion of the 1960s. 
The Federal Reserve began to raise the Federal funds rate in response to 
rising inflation in late 1972,  but growth rates of monetary aggregates remained 
relatively robust until more aggressive actions to tighten monetary policy were 
undertaken beginning in mid- 1973. These actions, together with other effects 
of the rise in world energy prices, helped bring an end to the expansion of the 
early 1970s.  The cyclical peak for this expansion is officially placed at Novem- 
ber 1973. However, owing partially to a speculative buildup of inventories, the 
sharp phase of economic downturn did not start until the late summer of 1974. 
As economic activity plummeted during the final quarter of  1974 and the 
first quarter of  1975, the inflation rate also dropped sharply. The nearly com- 
plete absorption of the price level effects of the increase in world energy prices 
by early 1975 was presumably another important contributor to the decline of 
inflation. In any event, the inflation rates for 1975 and 1976 were 6.9 and 4.9 
percent, respectively. This drop in inflation was a significant accomplishment 
relative to the high inflation of 1973-74.  However, it still left the inflation rate 
at the end of the deep 1974-75  recession above the rates at the ends of earlier 
recessions. 
2.2.2  Targets for Monetary Growth 
In the spring of  1975, at the behest of Congress and over objections from 
the Federal Reserve, the FOMC began to announce its intentions for monetary 
policy by specifying growth rates for monetary aggregates. At the beginning 
of each year, target ranges were specified over the subsequent four quarters for 
the growth rates of three monetary aggregates: (old) M1, consisting of  cur- 
rency and demand deposits at commercial banks; (old) M2, consisting of (old) 
M1 plus time deposits at commercial banks; and (old) M3, consisting of (old) 
M2 plus deposits at savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit 
unions. As a shorter-term guide for monetary policy, the FOMC also deter- 
mined target growth rates for these three monetary aggregates during the com- 
ing quarter. 
The target growth rates for monetary aggregates were not the operational 
guide to the actual conduct of monetary policy. At each meeting of the FOMC, 
operational guidance for monetary policy is provided in the directive to the 
manager of the Open Market Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Since the early 1970s, this directive had made reference to growth rates of 
monetary aggregates as one of the concerns of the FOMC that should be taken 
into account by the manager of the Open Market Desk. However, the directive 88  Michael Mussa 
provided the critical guidance for the operational conduct of monetary policy 
by specifying a target range for the Federal funds rate. 
The Federal funds rate is the interest rate on reserves lent between banks 
that are members of the Federal Reserve System and certain other participants 
in the market for “immediately available funds.” The manager of the Open 
Market Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York directly influences the 
Federal funds rates by open market operations that increase or reduce the sup- 
ply of immediately available funds that may function as bank reserves. During 
the 197Os, the monetary policy directive from the FOMC usually instructed 
the manager of the Open Market Desk to maintain a specific value of the Fed- 
eral funds rate provided that the monetary aggregates appeared to be growing 
within their desired short-term ranges. If the growth rates of monetary aggre- 
gates appeared likely to breach their desired short-term target ranges, the man- 
ager was usually authorized to make marginal adjustments  to the Federal funds 
rate within a narrow tolerance range. This tolerance range was occasionally as 
wide as a percentage point, especially during 1975-76,  but was usually limited 
to half a percentage point or less. Sometimes the language of the FOMC direc- 
tive indicated a quite specific value for the Federal funds rate. At other times, 
the manager was instructed to use somewhat more discretion in adjusting the 
Federal funds rate in the light of economic developments. 
The manager was generally instructed to seek further guidance from the 
FOMC if  adjustments of  the Federal funds rate outside its narrow tolerance 
band appeared necessary to contain monetary growth rates within their desired 
short-term target bands. In such situations, the FOMC might decide to alter 
(explicitly or implicitly) its monetary growth targets and avoid changes in the 
funds rate. Moreover, at any time, the FOMC could alter either its monetary 
growth targets or its prescription for the Federal funds rate if  that appeared 
desirable in the light of information about the actual and prospective perfor- 
mance of the economy. 
2.2.3  Recession and Recovery 
During the recession of  1974-75,  as the U.S.  economy experienced sharp 
declines in both real output and inflation, the Federal funds rate was reduced 
rapidly from its peak of 13 percent in July 1974 to 5 percent in late May 1975. 
This decline in the funds rate both represented the normal monetary policy 
responses to developments in the economy and mirrored the substantial de- 
clines in other short-term interest rates. The sharp decline in market interest 
rates, in turn, reflected both the credit market effects of the drop in economic 
activity and the substantial decline in the actual and expected rate of inflation. 
In the summer of 1975, as evidence of economic recovery accumulated, and 
as short-term interest rates moved modestly higher, the Federal funds rate was 
raised to 6.3 percent by late September.2  Subsequently, as data indicated that 
2. In this essay, the description of economic conditions that provided the context for decisions 
about monetary policy by  the Federal Reserve is generally based on the official “Record of  the 89  Monetary Policy 
M1 and M2 were growing below the lower limits of their desired target ranges, 
the FOMC directed a series of reductions in the Federal funds rate down to 
4.87 percent in January 1976. In May 1976, with indicators pointing to contin- 
ued vigorous recovery, and with M1 and M2 now growing above their target 
ranges, the Federal funds rate was raised briefly to 5.5 percent and then held 
in the range between 5.25 and 5.5 percent through the summer months. During 
the autumn, amid signs of moderating real growth, with the monetary aggre- 
gates apparently growing within their short-term target ranges, the Federal 
funds rate was eased downward to 5 percent in early October and to 4.6 percent 
by late December. As the year ended, M1 was at the midpoint, and M2 and 
M3 were marginally above the upper limits, of the longer-term target ranges 
established a year earlier. 
By the end of 1976, there was some evidence that inflation might be rising, 
while economic growth appeared sluggish. On balance, the evidence at this 
stage does not indicate that the Federal Reserve was knowingly fueling the 
resurgence of inflation. However, it may fairly be said that the Federal Reserve 
was not demonstrating much resolve to continue progress toward reducing in- 
flation below the level that had led to the introduction of wage and price con- 
trols in August 197  1. 
2.2.4  Falling behind the Curve 
During 1977, economic expansion proceeded rapidly, especially during the 
first half, while the twelve-month rate of  consumer price inflation rose from 
4.9 percent in December 1976 to 6.7 percent in December 1977. The Federal 
Reserve attempted to signal an effort to contain inflationary pressures by re- 
ducing, by  half a percentage point, the upper and lower limits on the target 
growth ranges for monetary aggregates. The Federal funds rate was raised by 
three-quarters of  a percentage point by  midJuly and by  an additional 1.25 
percentage points by year’s end. 
The seriousness of these efforts to combat the rise of inflation during 1977, 
however, is open to question. The Carter administration’s number one priority 
for economic policy was to maintain a vigorous expansion that would bring 
substantial reductions in the unemployment rate. The administration made 
clear that it did not favor a monetary policy that would interfere with this objec- 
tive.  On  Capitol Hill, especially among Democrats, who  dominated both 
Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee,” which is published periodically in the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin and is reproduced each year in the Annual Report of the Board of Gover- 
nors of the Federal Reserve System. Quite often, revised data provide a somewhat different picture 
of the performance of the economy than the Federal Reserve had at the time of its decisions.  When 
this is a factor of substantial importance, it will usually be mentioned in the text. Where the issue 
is not important, revised data (rather than  data available at the time) are  sometimes used in this 
essay. The figures in this essay are all constructed with the most recent, revised data. It is important 
to recognize that the image presented by these figures does not always correspond to the informa- 
tion that the Federal Reserve had available at the time. 90  Michael Mussa 
houses of Congress in the aftermath of Watergate, there was little sympathy 
for fighting inflation at the expense of progress in reducing unemployment. 
In this political environment, the Federal Reserve authorized increases in 
the Federal funds rate only after evidence pointed to continued strong eco- 
nomic growth and only when the growth rates of monetary aggregates ex- 
ceeded the shorter-term targets set by  the FOMC. Despite a cumulative in- 
crease of 2 percentage points in the Federal funds rate, M1 grew by 7.8 percent 
from the fourth quarter of  1976 to the fourth quarter of  1977-2  percentage 
points higher than M1 growth for 1976 and 1 percentage above the upper limit 
of the target growth range for M1 for 1977. For M2 and M3, growth during 
1977 was about 1 percentage point below growth during 1976,  but at the upper 
limits of the target growth ranges for the aggregates. 
In  1978,  economic  growth  remained  quite  vigorous,  while  inflation 
worsened considerably. Specifically,  real GNP rose by 6.3 percent on a fourth- 
quarter-to-fourth-quarter  basis, while the twelve-month rate of consumer price 
inflation increased from 6.7 percent in December 1977 to 9.0 percent in De- 
cember 1978. The target ranges for monetary growth in 1978 were set some- 
what lower than for 1977, and the actual growth rates of M1, M2, and M3 were 
reduced from their 1977 growth rates. However, as in  1977, M1 grew above 
the upper limit of its target range, and M2 and M3 grew near the upper limits 
of their ranges. 
On several occasions during 1978, the FOMC responded to the worsening 
inflation and to the rapid growth of monetary aggregates by raising the Federal 
funds rate, from around 6.5 percent in early January to 8.75 percent by  late 
September, and ultimately to  10 percent by  year’s end. In April, the Carter 
administration signaled the increased priority that it assigned to curbing infla- 
tion when the president announced a variety of measures directed at that objec- 
tive. At its meeting on 18 April 1978, the FOMC indicated the increased con- 
cern that it felt about rising inflation by reordering the official statement of its 
objectives in the directive to the manager of the Open Market Desk, placing 
“resisting inflationary pressures” ahead of  “encouraging continued moderate 
economic expansion.” 
Despite the actions and statements of  the administration and the Federal 
Reserve, by September 1978 it was clear that the efforts to combat rising infla- 
tion were not succeeding. At the end of the third quarter, virtually all measures 
of inflation were running significantly above their year-earlier levels. M1 was 
running well above the upper limit of  its longer-term target range, and M2 and 
M3 were at the upper limits of their ranges. In October 1978, the U.S. dollar 
came under heavy downward pressure in foreign exchange markets, indicating 
a worldwide crisis of confidence in the ability and willingness of U.S. authori- 
ties to take effective action to control inflation. 
2.2.5 
On 31 October and 1 November 1978, the administration and the Federal 
Reserve took action to deal with the crisis. The Treasury announced a variety 
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of  measures to acquire substantial amounts of foreign currencies with which 
to intervene in support of the dollar in foreign exchange markets. The Federal 
Reserve Board raised the discount rate by a full percentage point to 9.5 per- 
cent and established a supplementary reserve requirement for time deposits 
of  over $lOO,OOO. The tolerance range for the Federal funds rate was raised 
from between  8.75  and  9.25  percent  to between 9.25  and  9.75  percent. 
During the final two months of  1978, the growth rates of  the monetary ag- 
gregates slowed considerably but remained above or near the upper limits of 
their longer-tern growth ranges. The FOMC directed a marginal increase in 
the Federal funds rate to 10 percent, partly to support the dollar in foreign ex- 
change markets and partly to enhance the credibility of its efforts to combat 
inflation. 
The statement of Federal Reserve objectives for monetary policy in 1979 
made it clear that reducing inflation was the number one priority. The target 
growth ranges for (old) M2 and (old) M3 were set at 5-8  percent and 6-9 
percent, respectively-a  1 percentage point reduction in the maximum desired 
growth rate and a  1.5 percentage point reduction in the  minimum desired 
growth rate from the 1978 monetary growth targets. Anticipating  that the intro- 
duction of automatic transfer service (ATS) accounts would reduce the growth 
of demand for (old) M1 by 3 percentage points because of shifts from demand 
deposits to savings deposits, the target range for (old) M1 was set at 1.5-4.5 
percent. 
During 1979, inflationary pressures generally rose, while real economic ac- 
tivity followed an erratic and perplexing course. The increase in world oil 
prices, subsequent to the overthrow of  the shah of  Iran, contributed signifi- 
cantly to the increase in inflation. Specifically, the energy component of the 
CPI showed a 37.4 percent increase during 1979,  compared with an 8.0 percent 
increase during 1978, and this helped raise the overall inflation rate from 9.0 
to 13.3 percent. Even excluding energy prices, however, the rate of increase in 
the CPI escalated significantly from 9.2 percent during 1978 to 11.1 percent 
during 1979. Other measures of  inflation, such as the rate of  increase in the 
GNP price index or in average hourly earnings, also showed significant in- 
creases for 1979 over 1978. Moreover, most measures of inflation (except aver- 
age hourly earnings) tended to show higher inflation rates as the year pro- 
gressed-a  disturbing development  that  surely increased fears  of  future 
inflation. 
After registering an unexpectedly strong advance at the end of  1978, eco- 
nomic activity was believed (at the time) to have turned quite sluggish in early 
1979. Specifically, it was estimated that real GNP grew at a rate of less than 1 
percent during the first quarter. Incoming evidence during the spring and sum- 
mer pointed increasingly to an economic downturn. By the 11 July meeting of 
the FOMC, it was clear that economic activity had declined during the second 
quarter, and further declines were widely anticipated.  Indeed, the record of that 
meeting indicates that “no member of the Committee expressed disagreement 
with the staff appraisal .  .  .  [suggesting]  a further contraction in economic ac- 92  Michael Mussa 
tivity over the next few  quarter^."^ Ultimately, revised data would show that 
economic activity was  essentially flat during most of  1979, with moderate 
growth occurring during the summer quarter and again during the first quarter 
of 1980. However, as events unfolded during the course of 1979, it was gener- 
ally believed, at the Federal Reserve and elsewhere, that a recession was either 
in progress or about to begin. 
During the first half of  1979, monetary policy held the Federal funds rate 
nearly constant, in a narrow range between 10 and 10.5 percent. During the 
first quarter, (old) M1 declined, while (old) M2 and (old) M3 grew at rates 
below the lower limits of their target ranges. During the second quarter, growth 
of all the monetary aggregates picked up considerably, and, by early midsum- 
mer, each of these aggregates had reached or exceeded the upper bound of its 
target range. On 20 July, the Board of Governors raised the discount rate half 
a percentage point to 10 percent. On 27 July, the FOMC raised the upper limit 
of the Federal funds rate from 10.5 to 10.75 percent. On 14 August, the FOMC 
directed that the Federal funds rate be raised to an average of 11 percent and 
maintained within  a  band  of  10.75-11.25  percent.  On  16 September, the 
FOMC directed a “slight increase in the weekly average federal funds rate to 
about 11.5 percent.” 
This action raised the Federal funds rate in late September 1979 to 1.5 per- 
centage points above the level it had reached just after the dollar stabilization 
crisis in November 1978. In the face of  what was believed to be a very weak 
economy, most probably an economy already in recession, the FOMC believed 
that this was the appropriate degree of monetary tightening to combat clearly 
rising inflationary pressures? The economy, however, was not as weak as was 
believed at the time. More important, while the Federal funds rate had been 
pushed up 1.5 percentage points during the ten months ending in September 
1979, the inflation rate had risen by more than double that amount. Also, the 
monetary aggregates had risen from below the lower limits of  their target 
ranges in March 1979 to or above the upper limits of those ranges by Septem- 
ber. Once again, the Federal Reserve was falling behind the curve in its efforts 
to combat rising inflation. The foreign exchange market provided a further 
signal of this fact as the dollar once again came under severe downward pres- 
sure during the summer of  1979. Thus, eleven months after the administration 
and the Federal Reserve dramatically announced their new policies to curb 
inflation and strengthen  the dollar, it was clear that those policies were not suc- 
ceeding. 
3. Unless otherwise indicated, most of the quotations in this essay are taken from the official 
“Record of the Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee” (see no. 2 above). Several 
quotations, however, come from the semiannual “Monetary Policy Reports to Congress,” which 
are also published in  the Federal Reserve Bulletin and in the Annual Report. 
4. A majority of the FOMC certainly may be said to have held this view. However, some mem- 
bers of the committee (especially Henry Wallich and, on one occasion, Paul Volcker) dissented 
and expressed their preference for a tighter monetary policy to combat inflation despite signs of 
economic weakness. 93  Monetary Policy 
Of  course, the acceleration of  inflation during 1979 was partly the conse- 
quence of the second oil price shock that followed the overthrow of the shah 
of Iran. Had events developed differently, had the economy actually entered a 
recession in  1979, then perhaps the efforts to reduce inflation would have 
proved more successful. Moreover, it is understandable that the Federal Re- 
serve was reluctant to take decisive action to tighten monetary policy when it 
faced the dreaded dilemma of rising inflation together with an economy that 
appeared to be in, or on the verge of, recession. 
2.2.6  The Heritage of Rising Inflation 
The dilemma that confronted the Federal Reserve in 1979 was not exclu- 
sively, or even primarily, the product of political upheaval in Iran and the sec- 
ond oil shock. In substantial measure, it was the consequence of  failures to 
confront the rise of inflationary pressures more consistently and effectively at 
an earlier stage. Other countries, notably Switzerland and West Germany, that 
pursued more determined efforts to reduce inflation after the first oil shock in 
1973 did not see their inflation rates rise as high in 1979 as in  1974-75.  In 
contrast, the United States, which pursued a more laissez-faire policy toward 
inflation, confronted the second oil shock with inflation already rising through 
9 percent and saw inflation jump to new peaks during 1979. 
Moreover, the failure of U.S.  monetary policy to curb the rise of inflation 
during the late 1970s  cannot be explained away on the grounds that the Federal 
Reserve could not reasonably have understood the consequences of its actions. 
The failure is apparent not only in the persistent rise of inflation but also in the 
general tendency for monetary growth to exceed the targets set by the Federal 
Reserve. Specifically, as shown in figure 2.2, growth of M1 significantly ex- 
ceeded the upper bound of its annual target range in 1977, 1978, and 1979. In 
1975, M1 ended the year at the lower limit of  its target range. This result, 
however, was largely the consequence of slow growth of M1 early in the year, 
attributable primarily to continued decline in economic activity and to the 
more rapid than anticipated decline in the rate of inflation. Only during 1976 
was the growth of M1 close to the midpoint of the range set by the Federal Re- 
serve. 
For M2, as illustrated in figure 2.3, the story is worse. Only in 1978 was the 
growth of M2 close to the midpoint of  its target range. In  1979, M2 growth 
was at the top of the target range, and, in 1975, 1976, and 1977, it was signifi- 
cantly above the upper limit of the target range. Moreover, for both M1 and 
M2, the Federal Reserve followed the practice of “rebasing” its monetary tar- 
gets each year for the monetary growth that had actually occurred the preced- 
ing year. If the Federal Reserve had been effectively resisting the rise of infla- 
tion, this practice might have been defensible as a means of  accounting for 
unanticipated shifts in money demand. In the circumstance of persistently ris- 
ing inflation in the late 1970s, however, the practice of rebasing amounted to 
monetary accommodation of accelerating inflation. 94  Michael Mussa 
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The inadequacy of the Federal Reserve's efforts to curb inflation during this 
peribd is also apparent in the behavior of the Federal funds rate, as illustrated 
in figure 2.4.  The Federal funds rate was raised gradually from early 1977 
through 1979. However, these increases in the Federal funds rate often lagged 
behind increases in the inflation rate, indicating fairly clearly that the Federal 
Reserve was "falling behind the curve" in its actions to combat rising inflation. 
To observers outside the Federal Reserve, the developments of the late 1970s 
indicated that U.S. monetary policy was not deeply committed to resisting the 
rise of  inflation. Most important, the actual inflation rate was rising persis- 
tently, even before the second oil price shock. Monetary growth was generally 
allowed to exceed announced targets. New targets were rebased to accommo- 
date past inflation and past excessive  monetary growth. Increases in the Federal 
funds rate often lagged behind increases in the inflation rate. Thus, while the 
Federal Reserve talked about a battle against the demon of inflation, it gave 
little evidence of much stomach for the fight. 
2.3  The Demon Wins Another Round 
Paul Volcker replaced G. William Miller as chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board on 6 August 1979. For the preceding four years, Volcker had been presi- 
dent of  the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and hence a member of the 
Federal Open Market Committee. Earlier, he had served in the Nixon adminis- 
tration as undersecretary of the Treasury for monetary affairs-traditionally 
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financial policy in the U.S. administration.  Paul Volcker was very well known 
and highly regarded in the financial community and exceptionally well quali- 
fied to take command of the Federal Reserve at a time of economic turmoil 
and crisis. 
2.3.1  New Operating Procedures 
The appropriate starting date for the assessment of U.S. monetary policy in 
the 1980s is not the day of Paul Volcker’s accession to the chairmanship of the 
Federal Reserve, however, but rather two months later, 6 October 1979. On 
that Saturday, the Federal Reserve announced a new effort to discipline the 
demon of rising inflation. The discount rate was raised a full percentage point 
to a new record of  12 percent. New reserve requirements were imposed on 
certain liabilities of member banks. Most important, the FOMC adopted new 
operating procedures for the conduct of monetary policy. 
Under  the new  operating procedures, the Open Market Desk would  no 
longer be directed to keep the Federal funds rate at a specified level or within 
a narrow tolerance range but rather to supply a volume of bank reserves consis- 
tent with desired rates of  growth of  monetary aggregates prescribed by  the 
FOMC. Technically, the desk would operate by estimating the total volume of 
bank reserves needed to support the short-term monetary growth targets set by 
the FOMC. The amount of  borrowed reserves likely to be supplied through 
the Federal Reserve discount window would also be estimated. Through open 
market operations, the desk manager would then supply the implied amount 
of nonborrowed reserves appropriate to meet the target for total bank reserves. 
It was recognized that, under these new operating procedures, the short-term 
variability of the Federal funds rate was likely to increase substantially. A very 
broad tolerance range would be specified for the Federal funds rate for the 
periods between scheduled meetings of the FOMC. On 6 October the tolerance 
range for the Federal funds rate was set at 11.5-15.5  percent. Since the Federal 
funds rate had been running at about 11.5 percent during September, the new 
broad tolerance range gave wide latitude to the manager of the Open Market 
Desk to tighten reserve availability in order to reduce the growth rates of mone- 
tary aggregates as prescribed by the FOMC. 
The shift to the new operating procedures was motivated by tactical, psycho- 
logical, and political considerations  and not by a profound religious experience 
that suddenly converted most members of the FOMC to the doctrine of “mone- 
tarism.” Under the old operating procedures, the FOMC could have directed a 
large increase in the Federal funds rate in order to restrain monetary growth 
and resist rising inflation. Tactically, however, the FOMC did not know how 
large an increase in the Federal funds rate might be needed, and it recognized 
the virtue of  significantly greater flexibility in adjusting the Federal funds rate 
to deal with ongoing developments. Psychologically, in attacking inflationary 
expectations, there appeared to be a gain from publicly announcing a more 
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just a change in the value of  a particular policy instrument. Politically, the 
new operating procedures offered an important degree of cover for the highly 
unpopular action of sharply increasing interest rates and probably pushing the 
economy into recession. The necessary rise in interest rates would not be so 
visibly linked to Federal Reserve actions but could be blamed instead on mar- 
ket pressures arising from increased inffationary expectations and excess credit 
demands from the government and the private sector. The Federal Reserve 
could point to the generally agreed on need to resist inflation by restraining 
monetary growth as the essence of its p01icy.~ 
2.3.2  The Initial Assault on Inflation 
The financial market response to the new Federal Reserve policy was imme- 
diate and dramatic. On the following Monday, the short-term interest rates 
leapt upward, and long-term bond prices tumbled. During the final two weeks 
of October, the Federal funds rate rose to 15.5 percent, before falling back to 
13.5 percent in November and then edging up to 14 percent in late December. 
On average during the final quarter of 1979, short-term interest rates ran nearly 
2 percentage points above late September levels, while long-term interest rates 
rose about a percentage point above their late September levels. During the 
final three months of  1979, growth of  the monetary aggregates was  slowed 
very substantially from the rapid pace of the preceding six months; M1, M2, 
and M3 recorded growth rates of 3,7, and 6.25 percent, respectively. 
Economic data reported during the first three months of 1980  indicated rela- 
tively sluggish real growth during the final quarter of  1979 but an apparent 
pickup of  growth during January and February. Monetary growth remained 
subdued in January. In February, however, growth of the newly defined, narrow 
monetary aggregates, MIA and MlB, accelerated sufficiently to exceed the 
(relatively stingy) short-run target rates set by the FOMC. In response to this 
and other developments in the economy, the FOMC raised the upper limit of 
the tolerance range of the Federal funds rate (in a series of telephone confer- 
ences and at the regular meeting on 22 March) from 15.5  percent to 20 percent. 
The actual level of the funds rate jumped from 15 percent on 22 February to 
19.4 percent by the end of March. 
Despite the tightening of  monetary policy, inflation continued to be very 
rapid during the final quarter of 1979 and accelerated further during the first 
quarter of 1980. Specifically, the (annualized) six-month inflation rate was re- 
corded at 13.5, 13.3, and 13.4 percent in October, November, and December 
of  1979 and then at 14.2, 14.9, and  15.9 percent in January, February and 
March of  1980, respectively. Moreover, the remarkable surges in the prices of 
gold (to over $800 per ounce), silver (to over $50.00 per ounce), and other 
5. William Greider (1987) provides a detailed (if not always sympathetic) discussion of the 
political and economic rationale underlying the shift in Federal Reserve operating procedures. 98  Michael Mussa 
commodities by  early February  1980 suggested growing hysteria about the 
possibility of runaway inflation. 
In this environment, on 14 March 1980 President Carter acted to combat 
rising inflation. He announced a package of budget proposals to cut the pro- 
jected federal deficit, and he authorized the imposition of controls on consumer 
credit by  the Federal Reserve. The objective of these actions was to reduce 
pressures on interest rates arising from the federal deficit, to limit directly the 
growth of consumer credit that appeared to be fueling the inflationary process, 
and to attempt to break the psychological fear of uncontrolled inflation. As one 
high official of  the Carter administration once explained it, “We decided to 
whack the donkey between the eyes with a two-by-four to make sure we had 
its attention.” 
2.3.3  Recession and Reversal 
The budgetary proposals announced by President Carter were viewed with 
some disdain in financial markets and probably had little effect on the econ- 
omy. The response to the credit controls, combined with the Fed’s tight mone- 
tary policy, was virtually instantaneous-the  economy nosedived into reces- 
sion, with real GNP recording a  spectacular 9 percent annualized rate of 
decline. Short-term interest rates tumbled, with the three-month Treasury-bill 
rate falling from 15.5 percent in March to 7 percent in June. The monthly 
inflation rate fell off somewhat in April, May,  and June from the very high 
monthly rates in January, February, and March, but, on a six-month-average 
basis, the inflation rate remained very high. 
After declining slightly in March, the narrow monetary aggregates, M1A 
and MlB, contracted sharply in April and then flattened out in May. The June 
rebounds in these aggregates largely offset the April declines but still left both 
M1A and M1B significantly below the lower limits of their longer-term target 
ranges. The broader aggregate M2 declined only modestly in April, and the 
strong rebound in June left it just above the lower limit of its target range. As 
evidence became available of the shortfall of monetary growth below the short- 
term targets set by the FOMC, and as other short-term interest rates dropped, 
the Federal funds rate plummeted to the 13 percent lower limit of its tolerance 
range by 6 May. The FOMC promptly reduced the lower limit of the tolerance 
range to 10.5 percent, and the actual funds rate fell almost to this limit by 
14 May. 
At the regularly scheduled FOMC meeting on 22 May, the desk manager 
was directed to provide reserves consistent with monetary growth rates “high 
enough to promote achievement of the Committee’s objectives for monetary 
growth over the year, provided that in the period before the next regular meet- 
ing the weekly average federal funds rate remains within a range of 8.5 to 14 
percent.” Under this directive, the actual level of the Federal funds rate fell to 
9.4 percent by the end of June. Thus, in three months, the Federal funds rate 
had been cut by  10 percentage points from its peak in late March. By this 99  Monetary Policy 
measure of monetary policy, all the tightening between the dollar stabilization 
program announced on 1 November 1978 and the extraordinary measures of 
March 1980 was effectively reversed. 
Given the behavior of the monetary aggregates,  the sharp decline of the Fed- 
eral funds rate during the spring of  1980 was a natural consequence of  the 
monetary operating procedures of the Federal Reserve. However, the FOMC 
knew that it had a choice about whether to permit a decline of quite such speed 
and magnitude. It was not required by law or by  deep religious conviction 
to seek extremely rapid correction of all deviations of monetary growth from 
previously specified  targets. The manager of the Open Market Desk could have 
been instructed to tolerate substantial shortfalls of MIA and MlB  below their 
previously announced target ranges. The FOMC could have retargeted mone- 
tary growth in the second half of  1980 at the previously announced rates, but 
starting from the base established in the second quarter. This would have been 
consistent with the “rebasing” of the growth targets in earlier years, when the 
monetary aggregates had often grown near or even above the upper limits of 
the preceding year’s growth targets. 
The turmoil and uncertainty in the economy and financial markets provided 
good reason for the Federal Reserve to be cautious in its conduct of monetary 
policy. The virtually complete lack of experience with the Federal Reserve’s 
new operating procedures provided additional reason for caution. Such caution 
clearly did not justify an incredible, 10 percentage point drop in the Federal 
funds rate in an effort to offset one or two months of negative growth of mone- 
tary aggregates. There was no precedent for such action. Only two or three 
months into a recession that was widely regarded as the necessary consequence 
of successful efforts to curb inflation, there was no credible reason to believe 
that quite such a large and rapid drop in the Federal funds rate was necessary 
to forestall a repeat of the Great Depression. Moreover, as illustrated in figure 
2.4, the Federal funds rate fell much more sharply than any reasonable estimate 
of what was happening to the rate of inflation. This alone should have raised 
the caution sign that the Federal Reserve was being too aggressive in allowing 
such a large and rapid decline in the Federal funds rate. 
As suggested at the time by Governor Wallich, the Federal Reserve could 
have resisted declines in the Federal funds rate below 12 or 13 percent while 
awaiting more information about economic developments. This would still 
have meant a very dramatic 6 or 7 percentage point easing of  the cost of 
Federal Reserve credit in  response to  the  downturn in  the  economy and 
in the monetary aggregates. Moreover, the record of the 22 April FOMC meet- 
ing  reports  that  the  committee was  clearly  apprised of  the  dangers that 
“aggressive efforts to promote monetary growth might have to be reversed 
before long, perhaps leading to significant increases in interest rates,” and 
that “vigorous efforts in the short run to bring monetary growth into line with 
the Committee’s longer-run objectives could result in excessive creation of 
money.” 100  Michael Mussa 
2.3.4  Rebound and Resurgence 
Judged by  the behavior of  monetary aggregates, during the summer and 
early fall of  1980 monetary policy was very expansionary. From well below 
the lower limits of their target ranges in May, the narrow monetary aggregates 
M1A and M1B shot upward during the next five months, with M1A rising to 
near the upper limit of its range, and M1B rising above the upper limit of its 
range in October. (For the path of MlB, which was subsequently redefined, 
and M1, see fig. 2.2 above.) Meanwhile, M2 (as illustrated in fig. 2.3 above) 
rose from slightly below the lower limit of its target range to moderately above 
the upper limit. The Federal Reserve did not forcefully resist these monetary 
developments by rapidly reversing the spring decline in the Federal funds rate. 
The funds rate fell briefly below 9 percent in July and early August, generally 
remained below 11 percent through mid-September, and was pushed as high 
as 13 percent in the week before the 4 November presidential election. 
Of  course, in normal times, a 4 percentage point increase in the Federal 
funds rate in four months would represent a dramatic tightening of monetary 
policy. However, nothing about economic events in 1980 was very normal, and 
the Federal Reserve had no rational basis for believing that its actions to raise 
the Federal funds rate during the summer and early autumn of  1980 were in 
any way symmetrical with its actions to cut the Federal funds rate during the 
spring. In the spring, recognizing that a recession would probably be the neces- 
sary consequence of successful  efforts to reduce inflation,  two months of short- 
fall of  the monetary aggregates below their target ranges had justified a  10 
percentage point decline in the Federal funds rate. In the summer and early 
fall, with no firm reason to believe that substantial permanent progress had 
been made in reducing the inflation rate below about the 10 percent level, five 
months of very rapid growth of the monetary aggregates led to only a 4 per- 
centage point increase in the Federal funds rate. Moreover, as illustrated in 
figure 2.5, not only did the interest rate of three-month Treasury bills fall sig- 
nificantly less than the Federal funds rate from late April to mid-June, but the 
Treasury-bill rate also began to move upward fairly sharply two months before 
the Federal Reserve began to push the Federal funds rate upward. 
The recession of  1980 was sharp but very brief. By the summer of  1980, 
economic activity began to recover. Retail sales began to rise in June after four 
months of decline. Industrial production began to rise in August, having fallen 
8.5 percent during the preceding six months. Employment, measured by  the 
household survey, began to recover in July, while nonfarm payroll employment, 
measured by the establishment survey, began rising in August. Private housing 
starts began recovering strongly in June. After falling sharply in the second 
quarter, real GNP posted a slight gain during the summer. It then rose at a 
vigorous 5 percent annual rate in the autumn and at a very rapid 9 percent 
annual rate during the first quarter of 1981. 
For one month, in July 1980, the CPI was nearly unchanged. The monthly 101  Monetary Policy 
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inflation rate, however, picked up to 8 percent in August and 12 percent in 
September. Even with the benefit of the July CPI result, the inflation rate for 
the last six months of  1980 was 9.7 percent. The December-to-December 
change in the CPI for 1980 was 12.4 percent, down only marginally from the 
13.3 percent gain recorded for 1979. As measured by the GNP fixed-weight 
price index, there was no decline of inflation during the second half of  1980, 
and the inflation rate during all of  1980 was a percentage point higher than 
during 1979. 
2.3.5  An Abortive Victory 
In retrospect, especially knowing the price yet to be paid during the reces- 
sion of 1981-82 to refight the battle against inflation,  it is clear that the Federal 
Reserve accomplished only an abortive victory. Reducing inflation was the 
clearly stated, number one priority of monetary policy for 1980. The Federal 
Reserve clearly recognized that pursuit of  this priority implied substantial 
short-term risks for business activity. It specifically pointed to the midpoints 
of its target ranges for monetary growth during 1980 as implying significant 
constraint on inflation. Early in the year, the Federal Reserve took decisive 
action to crush the bubble of inflationary hysteria. However, when the econ- 
omy and the monetary aggregates turned sharply but briefly downward in the 
spring, and as the first glimmer of hope appeared in the long-proclaimed effort 
to reduce inflation, the Federal Reserve quickly and massively reversed the 
thrust of its policy. As year’s end approached, the monetary aggregates were 
not at the midpoints of their target ranges but rather near or above the upper 
limits. Despite the pledges of forceful and persistent action to reduce inflation, 
and despite the recession of  1980, “inflation did not abate in 1980,” as the 102  Michael Mussa 
Federal Reserve conceded in its “Monetary Policy Report to Congress” in Feb- 
ruary 1981. 
Of course, monetary policy is not made in retrospect. It is made in real time, 
without prescient knowledge of the future, and often without very accurate 
knowledge of what is currently happening. In this regard, 1980 certainly did 
not provide a congenial environment for the conduct of monetary policy. The 
economy shifted with unprecedented rapidity from inflation hysteria, to steep 
recession, and then back to expansion and accelerating inflation. There was 
little basis for assessing the impact on the economy of the imposition and sub- 
sequent removal of credit controls. Interest rates, usually a key indicator and 
instrument for the conduct of monetary policy, moved around with incredible 
volatility. The behavior of monetary aggregates was also extremely difficult to 
interpret and predict in the face of wide swings in interest rates and the deregu- 
lation of depository institutions. 
Moreover, the Federal Reserve’s new operating procedures seriously com- 
plicated the conduct of monetary policy during 1980. Partly, the problem was 
that neither the Federal Reserve nor the banking and financial system had any 
significant experience with the new operating procedures and certainly no ex- 
perience relevant to the turbulent conditions of 1980. More important, many 
members of  the FOMC apparently felt that if  was important to demonstrate 
the seriousness and the symmetry of their commitment to the new operating 
procedures. The procedures served to justify the aggressive tightening of mon- 
etary policy in the autumn of 1979 and the extraordinary  efforts to combat the 
inflationary hysteria of early 1980. When the economy tumbled into recession 
in the spring and the monetary aggregates fell well below their target ranges, 
symmetrical application of the new operating procedures demanded a very ag- 
gressive easing of monetary policy as measured by the Federal funds rate. In- 
deed, judged by  the standard of achieving the monetary growth targets, the 
Federal Reserve failed to cut the funds sufficiently in the spring of 1980. 
During 1980, the conduct of  monetary policy was further complicated by 
the political environment of a presidential election. In the autumn of  1979 and 
the winter of 1980, despite the likely political costs of a recession, the Carter 
administration supported, or at least acquiesced in, the Federal Reserve’s tight 
policy to combat rising inflation. When the economy fell steeply into reces- 
sion, the administration approved the Federal Reserve’s easing of monetary 
policy and surely would have been highly critical of the continuation of a very 
tight policy. It is unclear, however, that the administration  actively sought quite 
the speed and extent of reductions in the Federal funds rate that occurred be- 
tween late March and early June or that the administration could have effec- 
tively pressured a reluctant Federal Reserve to ease so dramatically. 
During the summer and early autumn, as election day approached, adminis- 
tration officials understandably became increasingly unsympathetic toward 
any tightening of monetary policy. Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve began to 
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Board of  Governors authorized a full 1 percentage point increase in the dis- 
count rate-an  unprecedented action so close to an election and one that elic- 
ited public criticism from President Carter. Despite this criticism, the Federal 
Reserve allowed or induced about a further 2 percentage point increase in the 
Federal funds rate before election day. 
Market interest rates, however, began to move upward ten weeks in advance 
of upward movements in the Federal funds rate. In particular, the short-term 
Treasury-bill rate bottomed out by mid-June and had risen about 2 percentage 
points by mid-August-a  fact that was known contemporaneously  at the Fed- 
eral Reserve. Also, an explosion of monetary growth began in June and contin- 
ued through the summer and early autumn-developments  that were known 
with only a brief delay at the Federal Reserve. Unquestionably, the Federal 
Reserve postponed actions to tighten monetary policy that were clearly called 
for by these developments under its own operating procedures. In all probabil- 
ity, political concerns about the consequences of a dramatic tightening of mon- 
etary policy shortly before a presidential election were an important reason for 
this delay. 
It should be emphasized that the political concerns that influenced the Fed- 
eral Reserve during the summer and early autumn of 1980 were not narrowly 
partisan-to  aid in the reelection of President Carter. William Greider, who is 
not a great admirer of the Federal Reserve, makes this point in Secrets of  the 
Temple (1987). He quotes Frederick Schultz, then vice chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board, as expressing the views of many members of the FOMC: “Our 
attitude toward the election is that we’d like to dig a foxhole and crawl in until 
it’s over.” Greider’s own conclusion is stated as follows: 
This disposition [to avoid political involvement] undoubtedly inhibited pol- 
icy makers from executing sharp, stringent policy moves in the middle of a 
campaign if such decisions could be postponed. The majority of the FOMC, 
for instance, might have been more open to the arguments for tightening in 
the summer of 1980 if it had not been the season for presidential politics. 
Some governors, if  pressed, would concede that during a campaign they 
would rather be easing than tightening if conditions permitted them to do 
so. Most of all, they wished for a smooth policy line that would avoid aggra- 
vating either political party. (p. 214) 
These political difficulties, together with the other substantial problems of 
conducting monetary policy in the extraordinarily turbulent and uncertain en- 
vironment of  1980, explain much of  the erratic, seesaw course of monetary 
policy. They do not, however, entirely excuse the Federal Reserve’s lack of 
persistence and determination in confronting the demon of  inflation. To  an 
important extent, the demon itself was the offspring both of the repeated fail- 
ures to pursue sufficiently aggressive anti-inflation policies during the late 
1970s and of the Federal Reserve’s generally poor record of combating infla- 
tion since the mid-1960s. During the spring of  1980, the Federal Reserve was 
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recession. As the record of its own meetings indicates, the FOMC was warned 
about the possible need to reverse that policy if the recession proved short and 
inflation resurged. It could and should have recognized the difficulties that 
would be faced if such a reversal became necessary in the midst of the presi- 
dential election campaign. 
Given the information available at the time, the Federal Reserve did not have 
a particularly sound basis for engineering the entire precipitous drop of  the 
Federal funds rate during the spring of 1980, other than the desire to adhere to 
its own new and untested operating procedures. If the Federal Reserve sought 
to adhere to these operating procedures, it should and could have acted more 
quickly and aggressively to restrain the resurgence of rapid monetary growth 
during the summer and early autumn of 1980. The dismal record of the Federal 
Reserve in nurturing and tolerating the rise of inflation during the preceding 
three years justified and necessitated sustained action to combat inflation. In 
1980, having summoned the courage to stand eyeball to eyeball with the demon 
of inflation, the Federal Reserve should not have blinked. 
2.4  Bloodshed and Victory 
The second and ultimately successful effort to combat inflation during the 
1980s really began, appropriately enough, on 4 November 1980-two  years 
after the dollar stabilization crisis of  1978 and on the day that Ronald Wilson 
Reagan was elected president of  the United States. For twenty-one months, 
until August 1982, the Federal Reserve would consistently pursue a very tight 
monetary policy. As a consequence of this effort, the inflation rate would be 
driven down from 12.4 percent during 1980 to 3.9 percent during 1982. The 
U.S. economy would also be pushed into a deep and prolonged recession dur- 
ing which real GNP would fall absolutely by  3.3 percent and the unemploy- 
ment rate would rise to a postwar peak of  10.8 percent. 
During the seven weeks following the presidential election, the Federal 
funds rate was driven up 6 percentage points, to nearly 20 percent by  mid- 
December 1980. The growth rates of the monetary aggregates fell off sharply 
in November and December. By year’s end, the November-December  slow- 
down in money growth pushed M1A back toward the midpoint of  its target 
range and drove M1B and M2 down toward the upper limits of their ranges. 
Alternatively, adjusting for the larger than expected increase in NOW and ATS 
deposits, it could be said that both M1A and M1B ended the year just below 
the upper limits of their target ranges, after having shot from being well below 
these ranges in late May to above their upper limits in October. 
2.4.1  Twelve Months of Tight Money 
The slowdown of monetary growth that began in November and December 
1980 continued into January and February 198  1, placing the narrow monetary 
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tionwide introduction of NOW accounts) well below their target ranges. Dur- 
ing this brief period in early 198  1, M 1A actually declined very sharply because 
interest-bearing checking accounts (not included in  MIA) became widely 
available to individual households. In figure 2.6, which plots the six-month 
annualized growth rates of M1A and MlB, this development is reflected in the 
large negative growth rates of MIA during the first few months of  1981. For 
MlB, the six-month annualized growth rate declines sharply in late 1980 and 
early 1981 but does not become negative in early 1981. For M2, the six-month 
annualized growth rate, illustrated in figure 2.7, declines substantially from its 
relatively high level in the early autumn of  1980 but remains above the rate 
implied by the midpoint of the FOMC’s target range for this aggregate. 
As evidence of the substantial shortfall in the growth of the narrow monetary 
aggregates became available in late January and February 1981, the Federal 
funds rate fell from around 19 percent to the 15 percent lower limit of  its 
tolerance range. This development probably reflected market anticipations of 
some easing by the Federal Reserve in pursuit of its monetary growth targets 
more than it did deliberate actions by the manager of the Open Market Desk. 
In any case, at its meeting on 2-3  February 1981, the FOMC decided that it 
would accept for some time a shortfall of the narrow aggregates below their 
short-term target ranges. Notably, at this juncture, the FOMC refused to autho- 
rize a further reduction in the lower tolerance limit for the funds rate. 
At its meeting on the last day of March, the FOMC decided that, because of 
the confusion associated with shifts of deposits between the narrow aggregates, 
it would cease to make reference to M1A in its directive to the Open Market 
Desk. At this meeting, it also adjusted the tolerance range for the Federal funds 
rate to  13-18  percent. However, the funds rate fell below  15 percent only 
briefly during April, before preliminary data began to show more rapid growth 
of the monetary aggregates. 
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Fig. 2.6  M1 money supply growth, January 1975-April  1990 
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Fig. 2.7  M2  money supply growth, January 1975-April1990 
Nore: The money growth rate is a six-month moving average of the M2 growth rate. 
By early May  1981, monetary data showed MlB rising rapidly toward the 
midpoint of its target range and M2 growing above the upper limit of its target 
range. The Federal funds rate had already been pushed above the 18 percent 
upper limit of  its tolerance range. In a telephone conference on 6 May, the 
FOMC authorized temporary excesses of the funds rate above this upper limit 
in order that "the reserve path should continue to be set on the basis of the 
short-run objectives for monetary growth." Two days earlier, the Board of Gov- 
ernors had raised the discount rate from 13  to 14  percent. At its regular meeting 
on 18 May, the FOMC formally raised the tolerance range for the funds rate to 
16-22  percent. When these actions were taken, it was clear that economic ac- 
tivity had expanded rapidly during the first quarter-the  final confirming echo 
of the rapid monetary growth of the summer and early autumn of  1980. 
By the time of the FOMC meeting on 6-7  July 1981, it was apparent that 
economic activity had leveled out in the second quarter, following a revised 
estimate of a very strong growth during the first quarter. The large April in- 
crease in MlB  had been reversed by sharp declines in May and June, and MlB 
(adjusted for deposit shifts into NOW accounts) was again well below the 
lower limit of its target range. M2 and M3 continued to grow above the upper 
limits of their ranges. Federal funds had generally been trading in the range of 
18.5-19.5  percent during the preceding six weeks. The FOMC lowered the 
tolerance range for the funds rate to 15-21  percent in its directive of 7 July 
and maintained this range until its meeting on 5-6  October, when the range 
was reduced to 12-17  percent. Through mid-August, the actual level of  the 
funds rate declined only marginally to about 18 percent. It then moved errati- 
cally downward, generally remaining above 15 percent through the end of Oc- 
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low the lower limit of its target range, while M2 continued to skirt the upper 
limit of its range. 
In retrospect, it is clear that monetary policy was really very tight during the 
twelve months from November 1980 through October 1981. For almost this 
entire twelve months, the Federal funds rate was kept above 15 percent, half 
the time in the range of  18-20  percent, On only two previous occasions had 
the Federal funds rate ever reached or exceeded 15 percent: very briefly in late 
October 1979 and for about two months from late February to late April 1980. 
Moreover, measured in real terms, subtracting the six-month annualized rate 
of change in the CPI, the Federal funds rate was exceptionally high from No- 
vember 1980 through October 1981-generally  in the range of 4-9  percent.6 
The monetary aggregates also indicated a very tight policy. As illustrated in 
figure 2.6 above, after spiking upward in late 1980, the six-month annualized 
growth rate of MlB  fell continuously during 1981 and reached almost zero in 
October. MIA registered sharply negative growth for most of  1981. M2 grew 
at an 8.7 percent annual rate between October 1980 and October 1981 but 
failed to keep pace with the 10.2 percent rise in the consumer price index.’ 
After twelve months of very tight monetary policy, information received 
during November and December 198  1 indicated sharply declining economic 
activity during the fourth quarter, after a small gain in the third quarter and a 
small decline in the second. A recession was now clearly under way, and it was 
expected to be at least as deep as the average recession since the Second World 
War. Data on consumer and producer prices were generally showing inflation 
rates much reduced from their levels earlier in 1981 and in 1980. Reflecting 
both an actual and an expected slump in activity and decline of inflation, short- 
term interest rates began to move sharply downward in very late September, 
with yields on three-month Treasury bills registering more than a 4  percentage 
6. There are several possible ways to measure the “real level of the Federal funds rate,” and they 
yield somewhat different numerical answers. However, using any consistent method of measure- 
ment, this measure of monetary tightness was exceptionally high, relative to previous experience, 
for a very long time during  1981, and it continued to be  very high until the summer of  1982. 
Subsequently during the 1980s, the real level of the Federal funds rate would generally remain 
very high by the standards of the 1960s and 1970s. For the measure of the real level of the Federal 
funds rate illustrated in fig. 2.4 above, this may be partly explained by  the possibility that the 
average anticipated rate of inflation during much of the 1980s ran somewhat above the six-month 
annualized rate of change in the CPI and by the likelihood that the sharp declines in this measure 
of  inflation during late 1982 through early 1983 and again during 1986 did not correspond to 
similar declines of  the anticipated inflation rate. However, an important  part of the continued high 
real level of the Federal funds rate (and other interest rates) during the 1980s remains very difficult 
to explain. It follows that this indicator of the stance of monetary policy needs to be interpreted 
with care. 
7.  The real quantity of any monetary aggregate  may be measured by  dividing the nominal quan- 
tity by  a measure of the price level. Using the CPI to measure the price level, between October 
1980 and October 1981, the real quantity of M2 was falling. In the context of the behavior of all 
the other indicators of monetary policy, this decline in the real quantity  of M2 should be interpreted 
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point drop by  year’s end. Long-term bond yields also dropped substantially 
from their peaks in late September, with yields on Treasury bonds falling 1.5-2 
percentage points by year’s end. 
2.4.2  Nine More Months of Tight Money 
The Federal Reserve responded to these developments by making monetary 
policy only modestly less tight. The discount rate was cut from 14  to 13  percent 
on 30 October and cut again to 12 percent on 3 December. The tolerance range 
for the Federal funds rate was reduced to 11-1  5 percent at the FOMC meeting 
on 21 November and then to 10-14  percent at the FOMC meeting a month 
later. The actual level of the funds rate declined from 15 percent at the end of 
October to 13.25 percent in mid-November and fell as low as 12 percent in 
early December before turning upward. Growth rates of the monetary aggre- 
gates picked up somewhat in the final two months of 1981, with MlB rising 
toward (but not quite to) the lower limit of  its target range and M2 rising a 
modest further amount above the upper limit of its range. The FOMC, however, 
was not disposed to repeat the (never officially conceded) mistakes of  1979 
and 1980 by directing a rapid acceleration  of monetary growth at the first signs 
of real weakness in the economy. The official record of the 17 November meet- 
ing of the FOMC notes (in the usual dry and understated tone of these docu- 
ments): 
Many members thought that an aggressive effort to stimulate MIB growth 
over November and December at a pace sufficiently rapid to compensate for 
the shortfall in October would interfere with achievement of longer-term 
economic goals and would risk overly rapid expansion of money and credit 
in later months, particularly if the effort were accompanied by a precipitous 
decline in short-term interest rates to levels that might not be sustainable. 
In 1982, the Federal Reserve stopped reporting and announcing growth tar- 
gets for MIA and relabeled M1B more simply as M1.8 In January, M1 grew at 
a very rapid 21 percent annual rate, after increasing at an 11 percent rate in 
December 1981. This placed M1 significantly above the target range for that 
aggregate established by the FOMC. M2 grew at a 13 percent rate in January 
1982 (originally estimated as 11 percent), after rising at an 11 percent rate the 
preceding December (originally estimated as 8 percent). These developments 
placed M2 slightly above its target range by the time of the FOMC meeting on 
1-2  February 1982. 
It was known at the time that most of the large January gain in M1, as well 
as much of the increase in this aggregate in November and December 1980, 
came from other checkable deposits (OCD). OCD consists of interest-bearing 
checkable deposits in NOW and ATS accounts at all depository institutions 
8. The definitions of M2 and M3 were also modified. Money market funds held by institutions 
were  removed  from M2 (and remained  in M3), and retail repurchase  agreements of  less than 
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and small amounts of demand deposits at thrift institutions and credit unions. 
OCD is the part of M1 (previously M1B) that is not in MIA, the old concept 
of  M1 consisting of  currency plus non-interest-bearing demand deposits at 
commercial banks. It is now known that OCD has a much lower transactions 
velocity than ordinary demand deposits, indicating very strongly that the Janu- 
ary 1982  increase in OCD and correspondingly  in M1 did not signal that mone- 
tary expansion was exceedingly rapid. Even at the time, there was good reason 
to suspect that this was true and to pay heed to continuing signals from MIA 
that monetary policy remained quite tight. The Federal Reserve, however, had 
removed M1A from any direct role in the short-run operation of  monetary 
policy in March  1981 and was committed to abandoning this aggregate al- 
together in February 1982. 
Knowing the Federal Reserve’s operating procedures, financial markets fo- 
cused on the short-run behavior of M1 (= M1B) and M2, for which estimates 
were announced weekly.  If  the Federal Reserve was believed to be serious 
about achieving its monetary growth targets (as apparently it was in late 1981 
and early 1982),  then market forces would automatically  tend to force the Fed- 
eral funds rate and other short-term interest rates upward once it was reported 
that growth of M1 (= M1B) was accelerating above its presumed target in late 
December 1981 and January 1982. In any event, whether as an automatic result 
of market forces or with some additional push from the Open Market Desk, 
the Federal funds rate did rise from 12.25 percent around 20 December to 14 
percent at the end of January. 
At the FOMC meeting on 1-2  February 1982, it was recognized that the 
January rise in M1 resulting from the rapid growth of OCD was probably a 
deviation that should not be corrected by  an effort to drive M1 rapidly back 
toward its target range. On the other hand, the FOMC was not prepared to 
ignore entirely the January increase in M1 or to alter its previously announced 
target ranges, or to reintroduce M1A into the monetary control procedures. 
Instead, to move M1 back toward its target range for 1982, the FOMC directed 
that no further growth should occur in M1 in the period January-March, and 
it raised the tolerance range for the Federal funds rate to 12-16  percent. It is 
noteworthy that this decision was taken in the knowledge that M1 (= M1B) 
had undershot its  1981 target range and that the rapid January growth had 
placed this aggregate only slightly above the lower limit of the extension of 
the 1981 target range. It was also taken in the knowledge that real GNP was 
estimated to have fallen at a 5.25 percent annual rate in the final quarter of 
198  1, that preliminary indicators suggested a further decline in output during 
the first quarter of  1982, and that inflation was continuing the clear trend of 
moderation that had begun in 198  1. Clearly, something had changed since the 
spring of  1980 in the Federal Reserve’s approach to dealing with the risks of 
recession and inflation. 
On balance, M1 grew very little between January and the end of June. M2 
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growth range in March and subsequently  ran essentially along this upper limit. 
After January, the Federal funds fluctuated generally between 14 and 15.5 per- 
cent and ended June at about 14.5 percent. Since the inflation rate (measured 
by the six-month annualized rate of change in the CPI) was running around 
6 percent, the Federal funds rate in real terms generally exceeded 8 percent. 
Economic data during this period indicated, on balance, little change in output 
during the second quarter. Nonfarm payroll employment continued to decline, 
however, and the unemployment rate rose from 8.6 percent in January (already 
above the 7.8 percent peak reached during the brief  1980 recession) to 9.6 
percent in June-at  that point a record unemployment rate for the postwar era. 
2.4.3 
By the end of June, the very slow growth of M1 for five months had erased 
the January bulge and brought this aggregate near to the upper limit of its 1982 
target range. M2 continued to grow along the upper limit of its range. At this 
point, adherence to the monetary targets would have implied continuation of a 
tight monetary policy to bring both M1 and M2 toward the midpoints of their 
announced ranges. Some members of the FOMC (Governor Wallich and Re- 
serve Bank Presidents Black and Ford) clearly favored this course. Alterna- 
tively, in view of  the depressed level of business activity, the FOMC could 
have explicitly raised the targets for monetary growth. Governor Teeters, long 
a proponent of a somewhat less tight monetary policy, was an advocate of this 
latter option. The FOMC pursued neither of  these courses. It did, however, 
raise the short-term growth targets for M1 and M2 by  2 and  1 percentage 
points, respectively, and it instructed the manager of  the Open Market Desk 
that “somewhat more rapid growth would be acceptable.” 
With this decision, the FOMC effectively began fundamental change in the 
course of monetary policy in the direction of substantially greater ease. Ini- 
tially, this change in policy was not apparent in the behavior of the monetary 
aggregates, as M1 declined slightly in July, while M2 growth increased mod- 
estly. In the face of a still deepening recession, however, the Federal funds rate 
dropped from 14.5 percent at the end of June to 15 percent by mid-July and to 
11 percent by the end of July. The Federal Reserve Board cut the discount rate 
half a percentage point, to 11.5 percent on 19 July, by another half percentage 
point on 30 July, and by another half percentage point on 13 August. By late 
July, financial markets began to take the hint. The yield on three-month Trea- 
sury bills fell more than 4 percentage points between late July and the end of 
August, while longer-term bond yields declined more than  1.5 percentage 
points. Stock prices began what was to become the great bull market of  the 
1980s with a strong rally in August. The Federal funds rate fell to 10 percent 
by  18 August and to 9 percent just before the FOMC meeting on 24 August, 
at which time the tolerance range was reduced to 7-1  1 percent. 
Monetary growth picked up considerably in August, with M1 and M2 rising 
at rates of  12 and 13 percent, respectively, and quite rapid monetary growth 
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generally continued to the end of  1982 and throughout  1983. The Federal 
funds rate fell to 9 percent by the end of 1982 and generally ran in the range 
of  8.5-9.5  percent during 1983. The discount rate was cut five more times 
between 17 August and 17 December, down to a level of 8.5 percent, where it 
was held throughout 1983. 
Thus, the very tight monetary policy that the Federal Reserve embarked on 
in November 1980 began to be reversed in July-August  1982-a  year after the 
officially recognized starting date of the 1981-82  recession. Economic activity 
continued to decline until November 1982, with the unemployment rate rising 
ultimately to a peak of  10.8 percent. The demon of  inflation, however, had 
finally been tamed. During the twelve months of  1982, the CPI rose only 3.8 
percent, and the annual inflation rate would remain generally in the neighbor- 
hood of 4 percent through the rest of the decade. 
2.4.4 
In retrospect, it is clear that the prolonged tightening of monetary policy 
from late 1980 to mid-1982 was the most important action taken by the Federal 
Reserve during the 1980s and perhaps the most important monetary policy 
action since the catastrophic failure of the Federal Reserve to resist the mone- 
tary collapse of the early 1930s. Four important points should be discussed 
concerning the rationale for this policy. 
First, an extended period of very tight money that would push the economy 
into deep and prolonged recession was not exactly the publicly announced in- 
tention of the Federal Reserve. Federal Reserve officials, especially Chairman 
Volcker, did indicate the need for a sustained and determined effort to combat 
inflation, even at the expense of considerable pain to the economy. However, 
in  its semiannual “Monetary Reports to the Congress,” the Federal Reserve 
usually suggested a more gradual approach to restoring stability to the general 
level of prices-an  approach that was officially endorsed by the Reagan ad- 
ministration. In this regard, a passage from the “Monetary Policy Report” of 
25 February 1981 is noteworthy: 
The Rationale for Tight Money 
It is essential that monetary policy exert continuing resistance to inflationary 
forces. The growth of  money and credit will need to be slowed to a rate 
consistent with the long-range growth of the nation’s capacity to produce at 
reasonably stable prices. Realistically, given the structure of the economy, 
with the rigidities of  contractual relationships and the natural lags in the 
adjustment process, that rate will have to be approached over a period of 
years if  severe contractionary pressures on output and employment are to 
be avoided. 
Second, while the Federal Reserve clearly did not  pursue a policy that 
avoided severe contractionary pressures on the economy, it is arguable that 
no such policy would have achieved a substantial and sustained reduction of 
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in the economy and in financial markets needed to be persuaded that inflation 
in the future would proceed at a substantially lower rate than in the past. Per- 
suasion would be very difficult because, consistently  for five years before 1981 
and generally for the preceding ten years, people who had acted on the assump- 
tion that future inflation would be low turned out to be the economic losers 
whereas people who had acted on the assumption that future inflation would 
be high had been the economic winners. 
Thus, to succeed in reducing inflation, the Federal Reserve had to establish 
its credibility as a consistent and effective warrior against the demon of infla- 
tion. Given the Federal Reserve’s dismal record in restraining inflation since 
1976, including the retreat of  1980, there was only one effective way for the 
Federal Reserve to demonstrate the anti-inflationary resolve of its monetary 
policy. The Federal Reserve had to show that, when faced with the painful 
choice between maintaining a tight monetary policy to fight inflation and eas- 
ing monetary policy to combat recession, it would choose to fight inflation. In 
other words, to establish its credibility, the Federal Reserve had to demonstrate 
its willingness to spill blood, lots of blood, other people’s blood. 
Third, the Federal Reserve’s tight monetary policy was partly the conse- 
quence of understandable and unavoidable miscalculation. The official record 
of the deliberations of the FOMC indicates that the likely depth and duration 
of  the recession were consistently underestimated. To some extent, this ten- 
dency was probably a psychological correction for the FOMC’s earlier errors 
in anticipating the 1979 recession that never quite materialized and in failing 
to appreciate the rapidity of the turnaround from recession to expansion in the 
summer of  1980. Outside the Federal Reserve, however, it was also widely 
believed that the 1981-82  recession would end five or six months sooner than 
it did-partly  because of the expected expansionary effects of the Reagan ad- 
ministration’s fiscal policy. 
Moreover, judging the tightness or ease of monetary policy in the turbulent 
economic and financial conditions of  1981-82  was no easy task. There was 
a sharp downward shift in the velocities of  circulation of various monetary 
aggregates that altered the significance of the growth rates of these aggregates 
as indicators of monetary policy. The occurrence and implications of substan- 
tial downward shifts in velocities were known and appreciated at the Federal 
Reserve. However, no one, including the Federal Reserve, had a firm basis 
for assessing precisely how much velocity shifted for different aggregates. In 
retrospect, knowing how much velocities did shift during 1981-82,  the Federal 
Reserve’s policy may now appear somewhat tighter than was reasonably under- 
stood or intended at the time. The Federal funds rate also became a less reliable 
indicator of monetary policy as market interest rates fluctuated with unprece- 
dented volatility and as the anticipated inflation rate shifted downward to an 
extent that was extraordinarily difficult to evaluate. For understandable rea- 
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in the context of a recession that turned out to be deeper and longer than origi- 
nally anticipated. 
Fourth, making due allowance for underestimates of the depth and duration 
of the recession and for the difficulties  in assessing the actual tightness of mon- 
etary policy, it is nevertheless clear that the Federal Reserve knowingly per- 
sisted in a very tight monetary policy for many months after the economy had 
fallen into rece~sion.~  Indeed, as early as July 198  1, with a year of tight mone- 
tary policy still in store, the forecasts presented to the FOMC pointed to a 
deep and prolonged recession even under the most expansionary options for 
monetary policy.'O Having backed off from further monetary tightening during 
much of  1979, and having reversed policy so rapidly and ignominiously in 
1980, most members of the FOMC recognized that this time they had to hold 
on to a tight policy until there was unmistakable evidence of real progress in 
reducing inflation. The financial markets particularly, and the economy more 
generally, were so sensitized by previous failures to control inflation that the 
Federal Reserve perceived little latitude to ease monetary policy before the 
summer of  1982. 
2.4.5  An Excessively Tight Policy? 
All things considered, it is still arguable that the Federal Reserve may have 
kept monetary policy too tight for too long during 1982. Taking account of the 
relatively high unemployment rate when the recession started and of the time 
before recovery restored the economy to near its longer-term growth path, the 
loss of output during the 1981-82 recession probably amounted to $200-$300 
billion (in 1982 dollars), or possibly more." As tends to be the case with long 
and deep recessions, many workers and businesses never recovered an im- 
portant part of the ground lost during this downturn. Other longer-term prob- 
lems of the recession and the period of very high interest rates-notably  the 
9. The disparity between the Federal Reserve's rhetoric suggesting a gradualist approach to 
combating inflation (discussed above) and its actual policy is not indicative of an effort to deceive 
the public or the Congress. People well understood that the Federal Reserve's policy was very 
tight, and it served the Federal Reserve's objectives to sustain this understanding. It was not polite 
or politically astute, however, to be too explicit about the casualties that might result from the 
Federal Reserve's policy or to contradict directly the administration's announced preference for a 
gradualist approach. 
10. At each meeting of the FOMC, analyses of the performance and prospects for the economy 
are presented in the  Greenbook and the Bluebook. The forecast presented to the FOMC at its 
July 1981 meeting is discussed explicitly in Karamousis and Lombra (1989). The most optimistic 
scenario presented for consideration by the FOMC envisioned an 8.3 percent average unemploy- 
ment rate for 1982 and an 8.8 percent average unemployment  rate for 1983. 
11. The Hodrick-Prescott filter used to construct the smoothed trend path for real GNP in fig. 
2.1 above indicates that real GNF'  barely fell below this trend during the recession of  1980 and 
was significantly above this trend in mid-1981. Using deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott trend 
to measure the output loss from the 1981-82 recession results in a comparatively small measured 
loss-about  $200 billion. If  the loss is measured relative to a trend passing through  the actual level 
of real GNP during the second quarter  of 1981,  the loss is significantly  larger-about  $300 billion. 114  Michael Mussa 
continuing problems of  the savings and loan industry-are  still of  pressing 
importance  in  the  United  States.  Other  countries,  particularly  in  Latin 
America, also felt and are still feeling the consequences of high interest rates 
and recession in the United States during the early 1980s. Moreover, given the 
fragile state of the U.S. financial system by the summer of 1982, avoidance of 
an even more serious economic downturn should be regarded as a fortunate 
outcome. 
Of  course, only a modest fraction of the cost of the recession of  1981-82 
(and of associated economic problems) can be attributed to excessive and inap- 
propriate tightness of monetary policy. Most of the cost is properly attributed 
to the necessity of combating  the virulent inflation that was, in substantial mea- 
sure, the consequence of previous laxity of monetary policy. Also, other factors 
such as the second oil price shock probably contributed in important ways to 
the length and depth of the recession. Nevertheless, if  a somewhat less tight 
monetary policy during 1982 would have shortened the recession by even three 
or four months, without sacrificing a great deal of  the progress in reducing 
inflation, it would have been a more desirable policy. 
The difficulty is knowing at what point the Federal Reserve could have 
moved to a somewhat easier policy without provoking an adverse reaction by 
raising fears of  future inflation. This problem clearly influenced the policy 
followed by the Federal Reserve, as expressed in the Federal Reserve’s “Mone- 
tary Policy Report to the Congress” of 20 July 1982: 
Unfortunately, these stresses [of the recession] cannot be easily remedied 
through accelerated money growth. The immediate effect of  encouraging 
faster growth in money might be lower interest rates, especially in short- 
term markets. In time, however, the attempt to drive interest rates lower 
through a substantial reacceleration of money growth would founder, for the 
result would be to embed inflation and expectations of inflation even more 
deeply into the nation’s economic system. It would mean that this recession 
was another wasted painful episode instead of a transition to a sustained 
improvement in the economic environment. 
Ironically, this statement  is phrased as an expression of the Federal Reserve’s 
future intentions rather than as a justification of its past actions. On the very 
day that this statement was released, the Federal Reserve cut the discount rate 
from 12 to 11.5  percent, signaling the beginning of what would become a four- 
and-a-half-year  period of quite rapid monetary expansion. During this period, 
interest rates, both short and long term, would be driven significantly lower, 
and the U.S. economy would substantially  recover from the devastation of both 
inflation and recession. By July 1982, enough blood had been spilled that the 
credibility of the Federal Reserve’s anti-inflationary policy was established. 
Now, the economy generally, and the financial markets particularly, would sigh 
in relief or cheer in ecstasy, rather than shriek in terror, at the fact and prospect 
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2.5  Savoring the Fruits of Victory 
The victory over inflation and the obviously distressed state of the American 
economy were the key considerations leading to the Federal Reserve’s shift to 
an easier monetary policy. Insofar as political considerations influenced the 
Federal Reserve’s decision, these considerations all weighed in favor of  the 
new policy. Concerned about the prolonged and deepening recession, many 
officials of the Reagan administration  had been arguing for some time in favor 
of an easier monetary policy. On Capitol Hill, despite the upcoming congres- 
sional elections, monetary policy was not an issue of partisan dispute. Promi- 
nent legislators from both parties had been pressing for an easier policy since 
late 1981. Indeed, some Democrats were pushing legislation that would have 
limited the independence of the Federal Reserve and required the pursuit of an 
easier, lower-interest-rate  monetary policy.’* 
As previously discussed, the Federal Reserve responded to criticism of its 
tight monetary policy by pointing to the necessity of maintaining a firm stance 
against the resurgence of inflation. In addition, Chairman Volcker and other 
members of the FOMC argued that the large and growing federal deficit was 
an important cause of  high interest rates and that serious efforts to cut the 
deficit were essential to reduce interest rates without reigniting inflation. The 
evidence supporting this view was, and remains, somewhat ambiguous. Never- 
theless, there is no doubt that the Federal Reserve’s concern over the effect of 
the deficit on interest rates was genuine and that this concern was widely 
shared outside the Federal Reserve, especially in the financial community. The 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982, which sought to 
reduce the federal deficit by partially reversing the tax cuts of 1981, was passed 
by Congress in mid-August. There is no clear evidence, however, that the pas- 
sage of  TEFRA was instrumental in persuading the Federal Reserve to ease 
monetary policy or that it played a particularly important  role in the subsequent 
decline of interest rates. 
2.5.1 
In addition to concerns about the general health of  the economy, it does 
appear that the Federal Reserve’s shift to an easier monetary policy was influ- 
enced by specific concerns about the stability of the banking and financial sys- 
tem. In late June 1982, Federal Reserve officials learned that the Penn Square 
National Bank of Oklahoma City was on the verge of failure. The failure of 
Penn Square, with its prospective losses to depositors, was publicly announced 
on 5 July. It sent tremors through the banking system-tremors  to which the 
Federal Reserve was very sensitive-as  other banks and their uninsured depos- 
itors and other uninsured creditors womed who might be next. 
Problems in the Financial System 
12. As on other issues concerning political influences on the Federal Reserve, an excellent dis- 
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Of even greater importance, Federal Reserve officials were aware at least as 
early as June 1982 that the government of Mexico was experiencing consider- 
able difficulties in arranging new financing for a large volume of commercial 
bank loans coming due during the summer. Many of the largest banks in the 
country were important creditors of the Mexican government, and Mexico was 
not the only country with large loans from U.S. banks that was in obvious 
economic difficulty. Default by the Mexican government would be a financial 
bombshell that could easily provoke a nationwide banking and financial crisis. 
On the thirteenth of  August-appropriately  a Friday-the  Mexican finance 
minister Jesus Silva Herzog arrived at the U.S. Treasury and at the Federal 
Reserve with the sad news that the Mexican government’s coffers were empty 
and that default would occur the following week. A large bailout package was 
arranged over the weekend, and default was avoided. However, the message 
remained clear-the  banking system was in serious  jeopardy unless something 
substantial was done soon to stimulate economic recovery. 
2.5.2  Full Speed Ahead 
As previously discussed, the Federal Reserve began to ease monetary policy 
in July 1982 and pushed hard in the direction of easing from August through 
December 1982. With the shift to a much easier monetary policy, M2 and M3 
rose from somewhat below to somewhat above the upper limits of their target 
ranges. M1 began to grow at about twice the maximum targeted rate and rose 
well above the upper limit of its target range by year’s end. Since interest rates 
fell dramatically during this period, and since M2 and M3 contain more inter- 
est sensitive elements than M1, the relative behavior of these aggregates was 
not surprising. Nevertheless, during the fall of  1982, the behavior of M1 was 
becoming an embarrassment to the Federal Reserve; it was indicating far too 
clearly that the Federal Reserve had given up  on the monetary targets an- 
nounced in February (and reaffirmed in July) in order to pursue a much eas- 
ier policy. 
At the FOMC meeting on 5 October 1982, this problem was solved by de- 
ciding that, “because the behavior of M1 over the balance of the year is subject 
to unusually great uncertainties,” a short-term target for growth of M1 would 
no longer be used as an operational guide for the execution of monetary policy. 
Instead, a short-term growth target for M2 (and M3) in the range of  around 
8.5-9.5  percent at an annual rate from September to December was the offi- 
cially stated guide for the manager of the Open Market Desk. The expiration of 
all savers certificates  in October and the introduction of money market demand 
accounts (MMDAs) in December were discussed as reasons for especially 
great uncertainty about the behavior of  M1. It is noteworthy, however, that, 
when MI grew unusually rapidly during January 1982 because of growth in 
its OCD component, the FOMC did not choose to ignore MI. At that time, the 
FOMC wanted to continue a quite tight monetary policy, and the behavior 
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ber, when the behavior of M1 was becoming an impediment to the FOMC’s 
desire to ease monetary policy, M1  got dumped as an effective monetary 
target. 
During the autumn of 1982, not only was M1 dumped as a target for mone- 
tary policy, but the whole procedure of using monetary growth targets as the 
operational guide for monetary policy instituted in October 1979 was effec- 
tively abandoned. The Federal Reserve returned to operating procedures simi- 
lar to those employed in the 1950s and 1960s, when monetary policy indirectly 
targeted the level of  the Federal funds rate. Under the procedures used from 
October 1982 until the late 1980s, the FOMC determined the “degree of re- 
straint” or “degree of  pressure” to apply to the reserve position of banks, as 
calibrated by  the extent to which banks needed to come to the Federal Re- 
serve’s discount window to borrow reserves. 
Given the level of the discount rate and the policies of the Federal Reserve 
that control borrowing at the discount window, there is a relatively precise 
relation between the amount of borrowing and the level of the Federal funds 
rate. In the official language of the directive, “maintaining the existing degree 
of restraint (or pressure) on bank reserves” means holding the Federal funds 
rate constant, “increasing the degree of  pressure” means raising the Federal 
funds rate, and “reducing the degree of  pressure” means reducing the Federal 
funds rate. However, since the relation between the “pressure on reserves” and 
the Federal funds rate is not exact and constant, there is more room for the 
funds rate to move around under indirect targeting than was the case under the 
direct targeting procedures used  in  the late  1970s. (Recently, since 1987, 
the operating procedures appear to have moved back toward direct targeting of 
the funds rate, but there has been no official announcement of such a change.) 
During 1983, the FOMC observed what was going on in the economy: a 
vigorous recovery of  business activity with no sign of  increasing inflation. 
With good reason, it liked what it saw. When the year was over, real GNP had 
risen by 6.5 percent (fourth quarter to fourth quarter), the unemployment rate 
had fallen 2.5 percentage points, and the twelve-month gain in the CPI was 
only 3.8 percent. On fifteen occasions, the Board of Governors turned down 
requests from Reserve banks for changes in the discount rate and held the 
discount rate constant at 8.5 percent. Throughout the year, the FOMC directed 
only slight changes in the degree of restraint on bank reserves, and the Federal 
funds rate moved narrowly (by the standards of  recently preceding years) 
within the range of 8.5-9.5  percent. 
The behavior of the monetary aggregates was monitored and discussed by 
the FOMC during 1983, but that behavior exerted little apparent influence on 
decisions concerning the degree of pressure on bank reserves. The deemphasis 
of  the M2  growth target early in the year was officially rationalized by  the 
instabilities created by the introduction of MMDAs. Rapid growth of MMDAs 
accounted for much of the very rapid growth of M2 during the first quarter of 
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rapid growth of M1 throughout 1983, and it only “monitored” the behavior of 
this aggregate. 
2.5.3  An Interval of Tightening 
In January and February 1984, the Federal Reserve maintained the same 
policy stance that it had adopted in  1983. The degree of pressure on bank 
reserves kept the Federal funds rate close to 9.5 percent. In a telephone confer- 
ence on 20 March 1984, the FOMC discussed recent increases in market inter- 
est rates and noted that “economic activity in most sectors was rising with 
considerable momentum, helping to generate strong demands for credit.” The 
committee decided to relax informally the 10 percent upper limit of the toler- 
ance range for the Federal funds rate. Subsequently, the tolerance range for the 
Federal funds rate was raised to 7.5-1  1.5 percent (at the FOMC meeting on 
26-27  March) and to 8-12  percent (at the FOMC meeting on 16-17  July). The 
discount rate was raised from 8.5 to 9 percent on 6 April. The actual level of 
the funds rate was kept between 10 and 10.5 percent through June, then raised 
gradually to slightly over  11.5 percent in August, and then eased down to 
around 11 percent in late September. 
The primary reason for the brief tightening of  monetary policy from late 
March through September 1984 was the worry that continued rapid economic 
expansion was raising the risks of an acceleration  of inflation. Estimates of real 
GNP growth indicated about a 9 percent real growth rate during the first quar- 
ter of  1984 and a still very rapid 7.5 percent rate of advance during the second 
quarter. When it became clear that the pace of expansion slowed considerably 
during the summer of 1984 and continued to be relatively sluggish during the 
fourth quarter, the Federal Reserve moved aggressively (but with some dissent 
within the FOMC) to reverse the monetary tightening of  the period March- 
September. In October, the Federal funds rate was pushed down to 10 percent. 
In November, and again in December, the FOMC gave explicit directives to 
ease pressures on bank reserves, and the tolerance range for the Federal funds 
rate was reduced to 6-10  percent. The discount rate was cut to 8.5 percent on 
21 November and then to 8 percent on 21 December. By year’s end, the Federal 
funds rate had been pushed slightly below 8.5 percent. 
In the official record of the FOMC’s discussions of monetary policy during 
1984, considerable  attention is devoted to the behavior of monetary aggregates, 
with M1 being resurrected to a status of some importance. After a year and a 
half of rapid monetary growth and a full year of economic recovery, the Federal 
Reserve wished to maintain the hard-won credibility of its anti-inflation policy 
by indicating a more serious commitment  to its monetary growth targets. When 
problems arose at the Continental Illinois National Bank during the spring 
and summer, the Federal Reserve sought to persuade financial markets that 
aid to Continental would not push the aggregates off target. Indeed, figures 

















Fig. 2.8  M1 and growth target ranges, January 198&April1990 
Note: The monetary targets are those established by the FOMC  at the beginning of each year for 
annual growth rates. 
in  the  entire history of  monetary  targeting by  the  Federal Reserve when 
both M1 and M2 ended the year near the midpoints of their respective target 
ranges. 
During most of the 1980s, efforts to achieve the monetary growth targets, 
especially for M2, had some impact on the conduct of monetary policy. In fact, 
except for the aberration rationalized by  introduction of  MMDAs in early 
1983, M2 ended each year of the 1980s within or very close to its announced 
target range. However, the target range was relatively broad, and the record 
indicates that achieving growth near to the midpoint of the range did not out- 
weigh the actual and prospective performance of the economy as a dominant 
determinant of Federal Reserve policy. 
Of course, 1984 was a presidential election year. Some in the administration 
were not particularly happy that the Federal Reserve embarked on a monetary 
tightening seven months before the election. Their concerns were more than 
narrowly political. Many monetarists believed that sharp changes in rates of 
growth of monetary aggregates were an important cause of economic instabil- 
ity.  While they  worried that  the rapid  money  growth from October  1982 
through 1983 might stimulate increased inflation, they also feared that too 
sharp a monetary slowdown might abort the economic  recovery. Such concerns 
about changes in the rates of  growth of monetary aggregates, however, were a 
bit too esoteric for most of the financial community and the press. By pursuing 
its announced monetary targets, the Federal Reserve probably helped insulate 120  Michael Mussa 
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itself from monetarist criticism. Thus, there was a marriage of  convenience 
between the monetary tightening that the FOMC believed to be economically 
appropriate and the conscientious pursuit of its monetary growth targets. 
In the latter part of 1984, an additional concern began to influence Federal 
Reserve policy: the extraordinary appreciation of the U.S. dollar against for- 
eign currencies and the actual and prospective deterioration in the U.S. trade 
and current account balances. The dollar appreciated consistently, with only 
occasional small reversals, from the summer of  1980 until it reached its peak 
in early 1985. By late 1983, on a trade-weighted basis, adjusted for relative 
movements in national price levels, the real foreign exchange value of the dol- 
lar against other major currencies had risen about 45 percent from its low in 
the summer of  1980. At the Federal Reserve, and in the administration, most 
of this appreciation was regarded as a favorable development since a strong 
dollar helped reduce inflationary pressures. By the summer of 1984, the dollar 
had appreciated about another 10 percent in real terms, and it continued to 
appreciate in the autumn (rising a further 10 percent by the time of the peak in 
early 1985). At this point, the exceptionally strong dollar became a major con- 
cern in discussions about monetary policy, as indicated in the official record of 
the FOMC meeting on 21 December 1984: 
As they had at previous meetings, the members gave a good deal of attention 
to the effects of  the continued strength of the dollar in foreign exchange 
markets. The related surge in imports was having a very negative impact on 
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ing curbed by  the appreciated value of the dollar as well as by relatively 
slow economic growth abroad. 
The directive from this FOMC meeting specifically refers to “the continued 
strength of the dollar in foreign exchange markets” as a factor that should lead 
to further easing of monetary policy. 
2.5.4  A Return to Easy Money 
During 1985 and 1986, conditions in the economy, rather than the behavior 
of  the monetary aggregates, continued to dominate Federal Reserve actions 
concerning the Federal funds rate and the discount rate. On balance, monetary 
policy was  quite expansionary, in an environment of  subdued inflation and 
moderate economic growth. 
Specifically, in early 1985, concerns about the strong dollar and evidence 
that suggested a significant weakening of economic expansion (following a 
modest pickup in the fourth quarter of 1984) counterbalanced concerns about 
rapid expansion of the monetary aggregates. The Federal funds rate was kept 
in a relatively narrow range near 8.5 percent through the first four months of 
the year. As available evidence continued to indicate a very weak first quarter 
and a quite sluggish second quarter, the Federal funds rate was reduced to 8 
percent in May and fell briefly to near 7 percent during June before returning 
to about 8 percent at the end of the month. The discount rate was cut from 8 
to 7.5 percent on 17 May. 
Nothing in the behavior of the monetary aggregates plausibly rationalized 
these adjustments. During the first half of 1985, M1 grew significantly above 
the upper limit of its target range, while M2 grew above and then along the 
upper limit of its target range. Moreover, revised data would ultimately show 
(years later) that economic growth had been considerably more vigorous dur- 
ing the first half of  1985, especially during the first quarter, than was believed 
at the time. 
During the second half of  1985, the contemporaneously available evidence 
generally pointed to a moderate pace of economic expansion after a very slow 
first half. There were, however, mixed signals from different economic indica- 
tors, and there was some division among members of the FOMC concerning 
the prospects for future growth. Indicators of inflation generally showed the 
lowest rates of the 1980s,  until modest upturns were reported in November and 
December. Despite persistent rapid growth of M1 above its target range and 
growth of M2 along the upper limit of  its range, the FOMC decided not to 
increase the pressure on bank reserve positions from July through December 
and made one decision to ease slightly at its meeting in November. The Federal 
funds rate was maintained near 8 percent from July until December, when it 
rose briefly and marginally to about 8.25 percent. 
International concern about the strong foreign exchange value of the dollar 
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Plaza Agreement of 22 September 1985. In this agreement, the finance minis- 
ters and central bank governors of the G-5 countries (France, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany) announced their intention of 
seeking a somewhat lower foreign exchange value of  the U.S. dollar and of 
pursuing other measures to reduce payments imbalances. 
The Plaza Agreement, however, had little direct effect on U.S. monetary 
policy. In the months before the agreement, the FOMC had been concerned 
with the strong dollar, and this concern was one factor that probably contrib- 
uted to decisions not to raise the degree of pressure on bank reserve positions 
despite rapid growth of the monetary aggregates (especially Ml). After the 
Plaza, similar concerns contributed to similar decisions. On the other hand, 
throughout the period, the FOMC was alert to the danger that a precipitous 
drop in the dollar might contribute to inflationary pressures or erode the confi- 
dence of foreign investors whose capital was essential to finance the U.S. pay- 
ments deficit. Especially late in 1985 and early in 1986, this concern provided 
a countervailing argument against efforts to ease the degree of  pressure on 
bank reserves. 
In early 1986, a division developed within the FOMC, and especially within 
the Board of Governors, concerning the advisability of further easing of mone- 
tary policy. Believing that the pace of expansion was becoming very sluggish 
and that dangers of a resurgence of inflation were remote, the four Reagan 
appointees to the Board of Governors favored some further easing. The three 
other governors, including Chairman Volcker, and most of the Federal Reserve 
bank presidents on the FOMC were unpersuaded of the need for further easing 
and feared the possible consequences for the dollar. On 24 February 1986, 
by a four-to-three vote, with Chairman Volcker in the minority, the Board of 
Governors approved the request of the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank to reduce 
its discount rate by half a percentage point. 
At a meeting later the same day, this decision was rescinded by unanimous 
vote of the Board. The Board’s Annual Report contains the following explana- 
tion of the shift: “Members who favored a reduction of the discount rate on 
domestic grounds decided that a delay of limited duration would be acceptable, 
given the outlook for easing actions by at least some other major central banks 
during the next couple of weeks, if not within the next few days.” It should be 
added that a number of requests for discount rate cuts were made by Federal 
Reserve banks in January and February 1986 and were rejected by the Board 
of Governors. Acceptance of these requests would probably not have been 
enormously troubling to domestic or international financial markets. An open 
split of the Board of Governors that undercut the authority of  the chairman, 
however, would have been quite a different matter. 
The key economic event of  1986 was the dramatic drop in world oil prices 
and its impact on both inflation and economic activity, Reflecting the sharp 
decline in energy prices, the CPI fell in February, March, and April. For the 
twelve months of 1986, consumer prices rose only 1.1 percent, compared with 123  Monetary Policy 
3.8 percent in 1985, 3.9 percent in 1984, and 3.8 percent in 1983. Economic 
activity in the energy-producing  states was strongly negatively effected by the 
drop in oil prices. In addition, many U.S. manufacturing industries were con- 
tinuing to feel the adverse impact of  the strong dollar. As the data came in 
during the year, they indicated moderate real growth during the first quarter, a 
very sluggish second quarter, and then stronger but still relatively slow growth 
during the second half. Years later, revised estimates of real GNP would show 
a 6.6 percent growth rate for the first quarter, a -  1.8 percent growth rate in the 
second quarter, a 0.8 percent growth rate in the third quarter, and a modest 2.3 
percent growth rate in the fourth quarter. These figures, however, were not the 
estimates on which the Federal Reserve depended in deciding on monetary 
policy. 
As evidence of the effects of the oil price decline became available, the 
Federal Reserve responded with actions to reduce interest rates. In coordina- 
tion with other important central banks, the discount rate was cut half a per- 
centage point to 7 percent on 6 March. Further half percentage point cuts were 
authorized on 18 April, 10 July, and 20 August, bringing the discount rate 
down ultimately to 5.5 percent-its  lowest level for the decade. The FOMC 
directed or permitted substantial reductions in the Federal funds rate from 
slightly above 8 percent in January, to slightly below 7 percent in June, and 
then to 6 percent or slightly lower for July-November.  Because of an extraordi- 
nary bulge of  demand for transactions balances associated with provisions of 
the Tax Reform Act, the funds rate spiked up to nearly 9 percent for a few days 
in December but fell back to 6 percent in early January 1987. 
In taking these actions, the Federal Reserve was often responding to devel- 
opments in credit markets rather than leading market interest rates downward. 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that, between January and July, yields on longer- 
term Treasury bonds and notes fell more than either yields on three-month 
Treasury bills or the Federal funds rate. Except for the last downward step on 
20 August, the reductions in the discount rate were clearly needed to catch up 
with developments that had already occurred in credit markets. 
On the other hand, the Federal Reserve did not strongly resist declines in 
market interest rates during the first half of 1986 and did not act to push interest 
rates upward as the monetary growth accelerated in the second half. Specifi- 
cally, except for a brief period early in the year, M1 consistently grew well 
above the upper limit of  its target range, and it ended 1986 with more than 
double the maximum prescribed growth of 8 percent. M2 briefly fell slightly 
below the lower (6 percent) limit of its desired growth range during the first 
quarter but then accelerated to reach the (9 percent) upper limit of its range by 
year’s end. M3 grew along the 9 percent upper limit of its desired range for 
essentially the entire year. 
Judged either by growth rates of monetary aggregates or by the behavior of 
interest rates, monetary policy was quite expansionary during 1986-for  the 
second year in a row. Thanks to the drop in oil prices, however, real economic 124  Michael Mussa 
growth slowed temporarily during 1986 (with a sharp downturn in energy- 
producing states), and the overall inflation rate (including energy prices) de- 
clined to the lowest level since the early 1960s. Thus, at the end of  1986, the 
U.S. economy had enjoyed four years of business expansion and five years with 
the annual inflation rate remaining at or below 4 percent. 
It should be added that economic activity expanded very vigorously during 
1987 and that, despite the stock market crash of October 1987, expansion con- 
tinued at a fairly rapid pace during 1988. With the slowing of the growth of 
real consumption spending and real government spending, improvements in 
net exports and in investment were the keys to continued overall growth. Spe- 
cifically, in late 1986, U.S. real exports, which had shown no net growth since 
1980, began to expand rapidly, recording a 50 percent rise during the next four 
years. The gain in exports also helped spark significant increases in real busi- 
ness investment in plant and equipment. The expansionary monetary policy of 
1985-86, operating through the exchange rate as well as through interest rates, 
was an  important contributing cause to these developments. This same expan- 
sionary monetary policy was probably also a key underlying cause of  the in- 
crease of inflationary pressures during the late 1980s. 
2.5.5  A Flexible and Credible Policy 
For four and a half years, beginning in the summer of  1982, the monetary 
aggregates grew,  on average, quite rapidly-at  rates that in the late 1970s 
would have implied very rapid inflation. Clearly, there were important shifts 
during this period in the relations between the growth of monetary aggregates 
and the growth of nominal GNP. To some extent, these shifts could be under- 
stood as responses of demands for various monetary aggregates to changes in 
interest rates or to changes in interest elasticities of demands for these aggre- 
gates arising from banking regulations and the introduction of new forms of 
deposits. In any event, on the whole, the Federal Reserve made appropriate 
judgments about the nature and magnitude of these shifts. It provided monetary 
growth sufficiently rapid to support vigorous economic expansion  without gen- 
erating increased inflationary pressures-at  least not pressures that became 
apparent before the end of  1986. 
Moreover, the Federal Reserve was  able to sustain quite rapid monetary 
growth over an extended period without generating intense fears it was fueling 
a resurgence of rapid inflation-fears  that might have necessitated a monetary 
tightening that would have cut short the business expansion. Thus, in the blood- 
bath of  the  1981-82  recession, and in the brief monetary tightening during 
1984, the Federal Reserve had firmly established its credibility as an inflation 
fighter. It was then able to utilize this credibility to pursue a more flexible 
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2.6  Keeping the Demon at Bay 
During the final three years of the 1980%  with one brief interlude, the gen- 
eral stance of  monetary policy shifted from fueling economic expansion to 
resisting the rise of inflation. The move to tighten monetary policy began early 
in 1987 and continued until the stock market crash on 19 October. For the next 
five months, monetary policy was primarily directed at reducing instability in 
financial markets and avoiding recession. Beginning in late March 1988, amid 
signs of  continued economic expansion and with some indications of  rising 
inflationary pressures, monetary policy became progressively tighter until June 
1989. Subsequently, while the growth of monetary aggregates remained quite 
sluggish, the Federal Reserve eased the Federal funds rate gradually down- 
ward. During this three-year period, as was the case earlier, developments in 
the economy, rather than the behavior of the monetary aggregates, exerted the 
decisive influence on Federal Reserve decisions about the Federal funds rate 
and the discount rate. 
2.6.1  A Move toward Tightening 
More specifically, during the winter of  1987, the Federal funds rate re- 
mained at essentially the same level as during the fall of 1986. With the Louvre 
Accord on 22 February, resistance to further significant depreciation of  the 
dollar became an officially stated policy of the U.S. government. At its meeting 
on 3 1 March, the FOMC devoted “a good deal of attention .  .  .  to the implica- 
tions of the currently strong downward pressure on the dollar in foreign ex- 
change markets.” The committee agreed that “the conduct of open market op- 
erations needed to be especially sensitive to any tendency for the dollar to 
weaken significantly further.” During April, the Federal funds rate was pushed 
up about fifty basis points, apparently to support internationally coordinated 
efforts to resist further dollar depreciation. At the regular meeting on 19 May 
1987, the FOMC agreed that “open market operations . .  .  would be directed 
toward some degree of  reserve pressure beyond that sought in recent weeks 
(but not necessarily greater than that prevailing recently).” This action was 
motivated both by concern about the recent increase in inflation (the CPI rose 
at a 5.9 percent annual rate between December and March) and by continuing 
worries about the dollar. 
During the first six months of 1987, growth of all the monetary aggregates 
slowed considerably from the rapid pace set in 1985 and 1986. The slowdown 
in January and February reflected the collapse of the year-end bulge of demand 
for transactions balances generated by  the Tax  Reform Act,  but the  slow 
growth in later months suggested significant tightening of  monetary policy. 
Specifically, by  the end of June, M2 was well below the lower limit of the 
5.5-8.5  percent growth range established by the FOMC, and M3 was near to 
the lower limit of its 5.5-8.5  percent desired growth range. For the first half of 
1987,  M1 grew at a 5.1 percent annual rate, nearly 11 percentage points below 126  Michael Mussa 
its growth rate during 1986. For the FOMC, which had abandoned targets for 
M1 for 1987, this slowdown may  have had little significance. However, for 
monetarists who focus on changes in the growth rates of monetary aggregates 
as a key indicator of shifts in the stance of monetary policy, it was important 
further evidence of a substantial tightening of monetary policy. 
From June through mid-August, the dollar recovered slightly and then stabi- 
lized in foreign exchange markets, owing apparently to more favorable news 
about the U.S. trade balance. Available data showed that the U.S. economy 
was continuing to expand at a moderate pace. Recent price data showed that 
inflation had fallen off somewhat from the relatively high rates of  the first 
quarter. Also, it became increasingly apparent that the federal deficit would 
register a large decline for the fiscal year ending on 30 September. Reflecting 
this good news on all fronts, stock prices continued to rise, with the Dow Jones 
industrial average recording a peak of 2,722 on 25 August. In this brief period 
of calm before the storm, on 11 August 1987, Alan Greenspan replaced Paul 
Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. 
2.6.2  The Crash 
In late August, disappointing news about the U.S.  trade balance, together 
with firming in foreign interest rates, brought the dollar under renewed down- 
ward pressure. Market interest rates in the United States moved up in sympathy 
with foreign interest rates and also (it appeared) in anticipation of tightening 
by the Federal Reserve. On 4 September, the Board of Governors raised the 
discount rate from 5.5 to 6 percent. Pressures on bank reserves were also in- 
creased at this time, and the Federal funds rate was pushed up about fifty basis 
points to slightly over 7 percent. At the FOMC meeting on 22 September, this 
increase in the funds rate was affirmed with a directive calling for maintenance 
of “the degree of  pressure on reserve positions sought in recent weeks” and 
with an increase in the tolerance range for the Federal funds rate from 4-8 
percent to 5-9  percent. These actions were taken with M2 substantially below 
the lower limit of its target range and with M3 slightly below the lower limit 
of  its range. Available information indicated continued, moderately strong 
business expansion. There was no direct evidence of any significant accelera- 
tion of inflation,  but recent declines in unemployment and increases in rates of 
capacity utilization raised worries that inflation might accelerate. 
Short-term interest rates in Japan and West Germany moved further upward 
in late September and the first half of October. The Federal funds rate moved 
up to 7.26 percent for the week ending on Wednesday, 23 September, then up 
to 7.56 percent for the week ending on 30 September, then down to 7.43 per- 
cent for the week ending on 7 October, then up to 7.59 percent for the week 
ending on 14 October, and finally up to 7.76 percent on Thursday and Friday 
of that week. These increases in the Federal funds rate were not mandated by 
the FOMC directive of 22 September. The explanation given in the official 
record of the FOMC meeting of 3 November 1987 states that computer prob- 127  Monetary Policy 
lems at a Reserve bank contributed to an exceptional increase in member bank 
borrowing (and hence in the funds rate) during the period from 22 September 
to 2 October. With respect to the behavior of the Federal funds for 5-16  Octo- 
ber, the official record states, “Federal funds and other interest rates subse- 
quently rose through mid-October as market participants appeared to antici- 
pate monetary tightening in an environment of firmer policy abroad, concerns 
about the dollar, and pessimism about the prospects for domestic inflation.” 
Thus, the Federal Reserve claims to have done nothing explicit to tighten 
monetary policy further during the two weeks immediately before 19 October. 
Indisputably, however, the Federal Reserve allowed market participants “to an- 
ticipate monetary tightening” when it could surely have disabused them of 
such anticipations.  Moreover, the actions of the Federal Reserve earlier in 1987 
clearly made such anticipations of monetary tightening entirely rational. 
The first paragraph of the lead story of the Wall Street Journal on Tuesday, 
20 October 1987, succinctly and accurately describes the event of the preced- 
ing day: “The stock market crashed yesterday.”  Three months later, while serv- 
ing as a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, I received a note from 
an able, intelligent, and normally sensible member of the White House staff 
suggesting that the word crash, which appeared many times in the description 
of the main macroeconomic events of 1987, be deleted entirely from the 1988 
Economic Report of  the President. Thus, while the Federal Reserve wished to 
deny (perhaps accurately) that it had done anything explicit to bring on the 
stock market crash, some in the administration wished to deny that the crash 
had occurred at all. 
The apparent tightening of monetary policy in early October was surely one 
of several economic fundamentals that contributed to the 400-point slide in the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average during the two weeks before the crash, including 
the 108-point drop on Friday,  16 October. The 508-point drop in the Dow on 
Monday, 19 October, however, is not plausibly explained by economic funda- 
mentals. It reflected pure panic.13 Moreover, knowing now that the crash had a 
relatively benign outcome, it might even be argued that monetary tightening in 
the weeks before the crash helped restore a sense of reality to a stock market 
that  had  risen  significantly beyond the  level justified by  economic funda- 
mentals. 
2.6.3  Aftermath 
In any case, the response of monetary policy to the crash was massive, im- 
mediate, and appropriate. A terse public statement, released on the morning of 
Tuesday, 20 October, stated, “The Federal Reserve, consistent with its respon- 
13. An opinion survey of financial market participants concerning the causes of the stock market 
crash was conducted for the Brady Commission. The results (summarized in the commission re- 
port) indicated that ‘‘economic fundamentals,” including increases in interest rates, were key fac- 
tors in generating the slide in stock prices during the two weeks before the crash. The crash itself, 
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sibilities as the nation’s central bank, affirmed today its readiness to serve as a 
source of liquidity to support the economic and financial system.” In the morn- 
ing and early afternoon of 20 October, the Open Market Desk pumped $17 
billion into the banking system-an  amount equivalent to more than 25 per- 
cent of bank reserves and 7 percent of the monetary base. The Federal Reserve 
also let commercial banks know that it expected banks to continue to supply 
credit to other participants in the financial system, including loans to broker- 
dealers to carry their inventories of securities. 
After a further, sickening decline on Tuesday morning, stock prices miracu- 
lously turned upward in the afternoon, and the Dow closed the day with a 102- 
point gain. Violent oscillations in stock prices continued through the week and, 
indeed, for the remainder of  1987. However, by  Friday, 24 October, intense 
worry and nervousness replaced uncontrolled panic as the dominant mood in 
financial markets. As things calmed down and the crisis demand for liquid- 
ity subsided, the Federal Reserve withdrew most of the high-powered money 
that it had injected on 20 October. To  avoid adding to turbulence in financial 
markets, it did so in a manner that kept the Federal funds rate very stable at 
about 6.75 percent-a  drop of  1 percentage point from the level just before 
the crash. 
The decline in stock market prices between August and late October re- 
duced the value of marketable assets held by Americans by approximately $1 
trillion. Since much of this wealth loss represented a reversal of  gains made 
earlier during 1987 (and not yet fully incorporated in consumer spending), at 
the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) we estimated that the direct negative 
effect of the decline in wealth on consumer demand would most probably be 
in the range of $25-$30  billion. The CEA projected that the effect on the econ- 
omy would be about a 1 percent reduction of real GNP below the path that it 
would otherwise have followed during the next three or four quarters. With 
exports expected to contribute significantly to demand for U.S. products (the 
heritage of the decline in the dollar since early 1985),  real GNP was officially 
forecast to rise by 2.4 percent during 1988. If achieved, such growth would be 
a not entirely unwelcome slowdown from the rapid pace of economic advance 
during 1987. However, at least at the CEA, two conditions were thought to be 
critical in order to achieve such a favorable outcome: avoidance of  a further 
sharp drop in stock and bond prices and a monetary policy that was adequately 
supportive of economic expansion. 
The FOMC anticipated that the lowering of pressures on bank reserves and 
the reduction in the Federal funds rate in the period immediately following the 
crash would lead to more rapid growth of the monetary aggregates. The op- 
erating procedures adopted by  the Federal Reserve in the aftermath of  the 
crash, however, placed little emphasis on achieving projected growth rates for 
monetary aggregates. Instead, they focused on maintaining stable conditions 
in money markets, which effectively amounted to pegging the Federal funds 
rate within a narrow range close to 6.75 percent. 
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growth of the monetary aggregates during the ten weeks following the crash. 
M1  actually declined at about a 4 percent annual rate during November and 
December, while M2 and M3 grew at rates of about 1.5 and 3 percent, respec- 
tively. At least at the CEA, there was considerable concern that monetary pol- 
icy was not doing enough to forestall the possible negative effects of the crash 
on economic activity. The concern on the other side (as expressed in the “Rec- 
ord” of the FOMC) was that any visible move to ease monetary policy further 
by lowering the Federal funds rate “would not be desirable currently, especially 
in the light of the dollar’s weakness and the risks to domestic financial markets 
and the economy that a sharp further decline in the dollar would incur.” 
The decline in U.S. interest rates relative to interest rates in Japan and West 
Germany after the crash did contribute to a modest decline of  the dollar in 
late October. Disappointing news about the US. trade balance and the U.S. 
government’s apparent laissez-faire attitude toward the dollar contributed to a 
further 8 percent decline in the dollar by year’s end. Clearly, the Federal Re- 
serve’s intent was not to resist these declines in the dollar. Rather it was to 
avoid the risk of  instigating an international financial crisis by  permitting a 
reduction in the Federal funds rate that might be interpreted as an explicit at- 
tempt to drive down the dollar. 
Since the Federal Reserve did not reduce the Federal funds rate further to 
stimulate modestly stronger monetary growth, we do not know whether there 
was really any serious danger that such a move would generate an international 
financial crisis. On the other hand, since a modest increase in inflationary pres- 
sures, rather than recession, turned out to be the main macroeconomic  develop- 
ment of  1988, it does not appear that more rapid monetary growth was really 
essential during the weeks following the stock market crash. In retrospect, 
therefore, the Federal Reserve appears to have acted wisely in not pushing the 
Federal funds rate further downward in order to achieve more rapid monetary 
growth at the end of  1987. 
Economic data available from late October through mid-December indi- 
cated that the economy was continuing to expand at a moderate pace during 
the period before the crash but provided little information about postcrash de- 
velopments. Data for the automobile industry, however, did  show  a  sharp 
downturn in  sales and a buildup in inventories. When estimates of  fourth- 
quarter GNP did become available in January 1988, they indicated that real 
GNP had continued to grow at a moderate pace but that much of this growth 
was accounted for by  inventory accumulation rather than by growth of  final 
sales-a  signal of future weakness in business activity. Meanwhile, the growth 
rates of monetary aggregates picked up considerably in January, while the dol- 
lar recovered somewhat in foreign exchange markets. The Federal Reserve re- 
acted to these developments by  reducing the pressure on bank reserves and 
easing the Federal funds rate downward by  about twenty-five basis points to 
just over 6.5 percent. Subsequently, the dollar declined slightly against some 
foreign currencies, but this appeared to be more in response to poorer-than- 
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2.6.4 
By the FOMC meeting on 29 March, recent data showed that the economy 
was  growing more strongly than previously anticipated. Concern was  ex- 
pressed about prospects for prices and wages, but “aggregate measures of 
prices and wages had not yet shown any sustained tendency to accelerate.” 
Monetary growth (except for M1) had remained relatively robust since January. 
In this environment, the FOMC directed “a slight increase in the degree of 
pressure on reserve positions.” It also decided to continue the shift (begun in 
January) of the operating procedures toward achieving the desired degree of 
pressure on bank reserves rather than placing special emphasis on maintaining 
stable conditions in the money markets. 
The trend of monetary policy established at the FOMC meeting on 29 March 
continued through the remainder of  1988 and the first half of  1989. Economic 
data indicated that the expansion was continuing,  although generally at a some- 
what slower pace as time passed. On balance, data on prices and wages indi- 
cated a gradual, mild increase of  inflationary pressures, with the (six-month) 
annualized rate of  increase in the CPI rising to 5.7 percent in June  1989. 
Growth of the monetary aggregates slowed progressively. Specifically, for the 
six months ending in June 1988, the annualized rates of growth of M1, M2, 
and M3 were 7.7,7.9, and 8.2 percent, respectively. For the six months ending 
in December, these monetary growth rates were reduced to 2.2,  3.1, and 4.8 
percent, respectively.  Then, for the six months ending in June 1989,  these mon- 
etary growth rates fell to -3.5,  1.9, and 3.4 percent, respectively. 
Meanwhile,  the Federal funds rate was pushed up progressively and substan- 
tially from 6.6 percent in March 1988, to 7.5 percent in June, then to 8.75 
percent in December, and subsequently to 9.8 percent in March, April, and 
May  1989, before declining somewhat to 9.5 percent in June 1989. The dis- 
count rate was raised half a percentage point to 6.5 percent in August 1988 
and by  another half a percentage point to 7 percent in February 1989. The 
increase in the Federal funds rate by about double the increase in the inflation 
rate, together with the very slow monetary growth during the first half of 1989, 
indicates a very tight monetary policy. The Federal Reserve was clearly indi- 
cating its determination not to “fall behind the curve” in the effort to resist 
rising inflation-as  it had with such disastrous  consequences  during the 1970s. 
The  1988 presidential election occurred in the midst of these actions to 
tighten  monetary  policy.  The  presidential  contenders,  however,  happily 
avoided any serious discussion of monetary policy. Republicans were relieved 
that the economy survived the crash without a recession and wished to avoid 
any criticism of the Federal Reserve that would only stir up needless contro- 
versy. The Democrats also saw nothing to gain from criticizing the Federal 
Reserve and sought to credit it, rather than the administration,  with the success 
in reducing inflation and managing recovery. Thus, the Federal Reserve was 
left to do its job without the political pressures often associated with a presi- 
dential election. 
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By mid-May 1989, the available data began to show significant slowing in 
the pace of economic advance, and this was confirmed by information received 
in subsequent weeks and months. Also, owing primarily to a partial reversal 
of earlier increases in energy prices, measures of inflation generally showed 
significant moderation during the summer and autumn of 1989. In this environ- 
ment, the Federal Reserve shifted to a somewhat less tight monetary policy. 
For the Federal funds rate, the small decline in June was followed by  a fifty- 
basis-point decline in July and by a further drop to 8.5 percent in November. 
Growth of M3 remained quite sluggish during the second half of 1989, and M3 
slipped slightly below the lower limit of its target range. In contrast, growth of 
M2 rose to nearly an 8 percent annual rate in the second half, moving M2 from 
below the lower limit of its target range in May to just below the midpoint of 
this range by year’s end. M1 shifted from significantly negative growth during 
the first half of 1989 to positive growth at about a 5 percent rate and was essen- 
tially unchanged for the year as a whole. 
It is noteworthy that, as the Federal Reserve moved to tighten monetary pol- 
icy in the spring of 1988, the dollar began to rise in goreign exchange markets. 
The upward movement generally continued until June 1989, and the dollar 
remained quite strong for some time after monetary policy began to ease dur- 
ing the summer of 1989. Initially, the strengthening of the dollar was regarded 
as desirable both in terms of  reducing inflationary pressures in the United 
States and in reference to internationally coordinated efforts to enhance ex- 
change rate stability. By  late 1988, however, the appreciation of  the dollar 
reached the point where the U.S. Treasury and foreign governments intervened 
actively, but generally not successfully, to resist further dollar appreciation. 
The worry (at least at the U.S. Treasury) was that a stronger dollar might seri- 
ously impede further reductions in the U.S. trade and current account deficits. 
The Federal Reserve carried out the foreign exchange interventions directed 
by the Treasury and, as is traditional, intervened on its own account in support 
of Treasury operations. However, the Federal Reserve did not alter its monetary 
policy in order to resist appreciation of the dollar. Monetary policy remained 
directed toward its primary objectives of fostering price stability and promot- 
ing sustainable economic growth. 
2.6.5 
The scope of this discussion of monetary policy properly finishes with the 
end of  1989. However, it is appropriate to mention two developments during 
1990 that are relevant for assessing monetary policy in the 1980s. First, infla- 
tion accelerated briefly in early 1990 owing primarily (but not exclusively) to 
an extraordinary 2 percent bulge of consumer prices in January. This raised the 
six-month annualized rate of change in the CPI to 6 percent for the first half 
of  1990, providing further evidence that the Federal Reserve was not merely 
tilting at windmills in its efforts to resist the acceleration of  inflation during 
the late 1980s. Second, economic expansion was very sluggish during the first 
half of  1990, and recently revised GNP data also show very sluggish growth 
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during most of  1989. Specifically, for the five quarters starting with the spring 
of  1989, the most recent (July 1990) estimates of the annualized growth rates 
of real GNP are the following: 1.6, 1.7,0.3, 1.7, and 1.2 percent, respectively. 
Preliminary evidence for the summer quarter of  1990, even before Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, indicates that, at best, economic expansion is 
continuing at a very slow pace. 
No doubt, factors other than tight monetary policy contributed to this recent 
sluggishness in real economic growth. Nevertheless, it illustrates that deter- 
mined efforts by  the Federal Reserve to resist increases in inflation have  a 
short-run cost in terms of the real growth of the economy. It also raises the 
question of whether the Federal Reserve was perhaps a little too forceful in its 
efforts to resist inflation during 1988-89  and a little tardy in its more recent 
actions to ease monetary policy. Any hope of  providing a reasonably clean 
answer to that question, however, has probably become another victim of Sad- 
dam Hussein’s aggression. If the U.S.  economy falls into recession during the 
second half of  1990 or in early 1991, it will be extremely difficult to disen- 
tangle the effects of Federal Reserve policy before the 2 August invasion of 
Kuwait from the direct and indirect effects of  the recent substantial rise in 
world oil prices. Moreover, the Federal Reserve now faces the delicate task of 
dealing both with negative output and employment effects of  the rise in oil 
prices and with a short-term rise of inflationary pressures that is not the conse- 
quence of an excessively easy monetary policy. 
2.7  Hail to the Chief 
Since the Federal Reserve exercises very considerable independence in its 
conduct of monetary policy, this essay has focused primarily on the actions of 
the Federal Reserve. However, the Federal Reserve does not operate in a politi- 
cal vacuum, and its monetary policy must at least take some account of  the 
economic policies of the administration and the Congress. In this regard, the 
key question for the 1980s is, What did Ronald Reagan do to win the great 
battle against inflation? 
My answer may not be entirely unbiased. As a member of the Council of 
Economic Advisers for more than two years (from 1986 to 1988), it was part 
of my job to defend, as best as possible, the economic policies of the Reagan 
administration.  However, I would identify the primary contributions of Ronald 
Reagan to the effort to reduce inflation as occurring much earlier in his admin- 
istration. 
2.7.1  Sending a Message 
When the air traffic controllers went out on an illegal strike against the fed- 
eral government in the spring of  198  1, Ronald Reagan fired them. Beyond the 
federal workers who were directly affected, this action sent an important mes- 
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public support for the firing of the air traffic controllers, together with the re- 
sults of  the  1980 election, indicated forcefully that  the American people 
wanted something serious done about the problem of inflation and would sup- 
port tough measures to accomplish the task. The import of this message was 
not lost at the Federal Reserve or among those who exercised more direct in- 
fluence over the setting of prices and wages. 
There is no reliable way to estimate the extent to which the changed climate 
of labor-management relations may have diminished inflationary pressures in 
the early 1980s. It is noteworthy, however, that studies based on the experience 
of the 1960s and the 1970s generally suggested that a prolonged period of very 
high unemployment might be required in order to make substantial progress 
in reducing rates of nominal wage gr0~th.I~  In the recession of 1981-82,  the 
unemployment rate did rise to a postwar peak, and it remained relatively high 
through the initial stages of recovery. However, even given these high rates of 
unemployment, the drop in the rate of wage inflation during the early 1980s 
was surprisingly rapid. 
2.7.2  Cutting Taxes 
Along more traditional lines, but for reasons that are not widely appreciated, 
the Reagan administration’s fiscal policy may have aided the effort to reduce 
inflation, or at least ameliorated the recessionary consequences of  the tight 
monetary policy that was the essential weapon in the battle against inflation. 
From the perspective of Keynesian open-economy macroeconomics, the clas- 
sic policy prescription to minimize the unemployment costs of reducing infla- 
tion is a tight monetary policy combined with an easy fiscal policy. This pre- 
scription is based on the presumption that monetary policy has a comparative 
advantage in influencing the price level while fiscal policy has a comparative 
advantage in affecting the level of  output and employment. Moreover, in an 
open economy operating under a floating exchange rate, the combination of a 
tight monetary policy and an easy fiscal policy tends to appreciate the foreign 
exchange value of domestic currency, which assists in reducing inflation.I5 
Of course, given its generally anti-Keynesian bias, the administration  would 
14. A classic analysis of this issue is provided in Tobin (1980). Many other analyses also sug- 
gested that a prolonged period of high unemployment  would be necessary to make much progress 
in reducing the core rate of wage inflation. 
15. Even if  an expansionary fiscal policy was desirable for macroeconomics stabilization pur- 
poses during the early 198Os, it does not necessarily follow that the Reagan administration’s fiscal 
policy was entirely appropriate. On the supply side, the effects of the tax cuts may not have been 
as large as their advocates supposed. On the demand side, perhaps the tax cuts legislated in 1981 
(and partially reversed in 1982) were too much of a good thing. Moreover, if the Reagan adminis- 
tration’s fiscal policy was helpful from a Keynesian macroeconomic  perspective, this should proba- 
bly be regarded as a fortunate accident. It should not be taken as a lesson that fiscal policy can 
often be used, in a flexible manner, for macroeconomic stabilization purposes. On the other hand, 
the practical and political barriers to the flexible use of fiscal policy, and the serious problem of 
getting the timing right, do not obliterate the €avorable effect of  an important fiscal policy action 
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not usually advance such arguments. Instead, it would point to the favorable 
“supply-side” effects of the Reagan tax cuts both in encouraging increased 
output and employment and in reducing inflationary pressures. Probably both 
lines of argument contain some element of truth. In any case, the inflation rate 
did come down more rapidly than was widely expected, the dollar did appreci- 
ate strongly in foreign exchange markets, and the U.S.  economy did recover 
very rapidly from the recession of the early 1980s-generally  more rapidly 
than other industrial countries that pursued different combinations  of monetary 
and fiscal policy.16 
At the Federal Reserve, the administration’s fiscal policy was generally re- 
garded as more of  a problem for the conduct of  monetary policy than as a 
benefit. During 1982, it was  anticipated that the phasing in of  the tax cuts 
legislated in 1981 would help propel the economy out of recession. However, 
the dominant view expressed by the Federal Reserve was that the large actual 
and prospective federal deficits  pushed interest rates higher, eroded confidence 
in the government’s anti-inflation program, and impaired the Federal Reserve’s 
policy to curb inflation without excessive costs in terms of output and employ- 
ment. This complaint about the budget deficit was repeated, almost as a reli- 
gious incantation, in virtually every public statement by the Federal Reserve. 
In particular, the “Monetary Policy Report to Congress” of  20 July  1982 
(quoted earlier) puts the issue as follows: 
The policy of firm restraint on monetary growth has contributed importantly 
to recent progress toward reducing inflation. But when inflationary cost 
trends becomes entrenched, the process of  slowing monetary growth can 
entail economic and financial stresses, especially when so much of the bur- 
den of dealing with inflation rests on monetary policy. . . . 
The present and prospective pressures on financial markets urgently need 
to be eased not by  relaxing discipline on money growth, but by  adopting 
policies that will ensure a lower and declining federal deficit. 
Thus, monetary policy gets the credit for reducing inflation, while  en- 
trenched inflationary cost trends and the federal deficit get the blame for the 
recession and high interest rates. Ironically, as previously noted, on the very 
day that this “Monetary Policy Report” was issued, the Federal Reserve began 
precisely the relaxation of monetary policy that it argues against in this state- 
ment. During the next five months, interest rates tumbled downward under the 
16. The administration’s easy fiscal policy may also have interacted with the Federal Reserve’s 
tight monetary policy through their combined impact on the foreign exchange value of the dollar, 
which, in turn,  influenced both inflation and economic activity. Martin Feldstein has long been a 
leading proponent of this view, arguing that the actual and expected fiscal deficit was a leading 
cause of dollar appreciation during the early  1980s-a  development that helped bring down the 
inflation rate (see, e.g., Feldstein 1986). Feldstein has also argued that the Federal Reserve’s mone- 
tary policy determined primarily the course of nominal GNP. In  the face of this monetary policy, 
the  administration’s expansionary fiscal policy contributed to greater growth of real GNP  and to 
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impact of a much easier monetary policy, despite continued expansion of the 
federal deficit. 
Of course, the administration’s fiscal policy (and the large deficits to which 
it contributed) did not push interest rates lower. Qualitatively, the effect must 
have been in the other dire~ti0n.I~  The problem for the Federal Reserve was 
that it tended to be blamed for high interest rates, and, with some justification, 
it wanted to shift part of  the blame to the administration and the Congress. 
However, from the perspective of the overall conduct of macroeconomic pol- 
icy, in the circumstances of the early 1980s, an expansionary fiscal policy that 
may have put some upward pressure on interest rates was not necessarily inap- 
propriate. In contrast, late in the 1980s,  the key task for macroeconomic policy 
was to resist a rise of inflation, with an economy functioning relatively near to 
full capacity and with substantial continuing deficits in the trade and current 
accounts. In this situation, it might have made sense to rely somewhat less on 
a tightening of monetary policy to resist rising inflation. Certainly, it would 
have been desirable to make somewhat greater progress in reducing the fed- 
eral deficit.I8 
2.7.3  Staying the Course 
Probably the most important contribution of  President Reagan to the fight 
against inflation was not something that he did but something that he did not 
do. During the critical period of  1981-82,  he did not pressure the Federal Re- 
serve to back off of its tight monetary policy before a convincing victory had 
been won over the demon of inflation. Despite its much vaunted “political inde- 
pendence,’’ the Federal Reserve could not persist in a tight monetary policy 
during a deep recession against the determined opposition of a popular presi- 
dent. Nicholas Biddle and the Second Bank of the United States were taught 
that lesson by  Andrew Jackson, and, for eighty years thereafter, the United 
States had no central bank. More recently, one can imagine what Lyndon John- 
17. There are many papers dealing with the effects of the government  budget deficits on interest 
rates. They do not all reach the same conclusion. For one view, see Blanchard and Summers 
(1984). For an alternative view, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990). My reading of the evidence 
is that it is difficult to make a convincing case that movements in the federal deficit (either actual or 
anticipated)  were the dominant cause of movements in nominal or real interest rates-the  timing is 
just not right. The enormous swings in interest rates from the summer of  1979 through early 1981 
are not associated with dramatic movements in fiscal policy. The large drop in interest rates after 
the summer of  1982 does not correspond to news about exceptionally favorable developments 
for the deficit. The rise in interest rates during 1984 does not correspond to unforeseen adverse 
developments for the deficit. The decline in interest rates during 1985-86  is not generally associ- 
ated with favorable news on the deficit. During 1987, the rise in interest rates before the stock 
market crash was associated with an unexpectedly large decline in the deficit. The rise of interest 
rates from early 1988 through the spring of  1989 corresponds to no significant development con- 
cerning the deficit. In all these episodes, it is far easier to see the influence of monetary policy 
than of fiscal policy on the behavior of interest rates. 
18. As discussed in chap. 2 of Economic Report ofthe President, 1987, many of the arguments 
for reducing the federal deficit do not depend on whether the deficit has a dominant effect on the 
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son or Richard Nixon would have done had their personal political popularity 
dropped substantially  and their party faced significant midterm electoral losses 
because of  an excessively tight monetary policy directed by  a group of  ap- 
pointed officials at the Federal Reserve. 
In this connection, it should be emphasized that, while the Federal Reserve 
enjoyed some support for its tight policy in the financial community, it was not 
popular with the home builders and construction  workers, with the automakers 
and autoworkers, with the farmers and farm implement makers, and with the 
whole array of business and labor that felt the pain of tight money, high interest 
rates, and recession. Congress generally pays attention to the financial commu- 
nity on financial matters. However, Congress always pays close attention to 
expressions of pain and complaint from constituents back home. Hence, tight 
money is rarely popular on Capitol Hill. In 1981-82,  many members of Con- 
gress and congressional leaders from both parties were highly critical of  the 
Federal Reserve’s tight monetary policy. Senator Robert Byrd, leader of  the 
Democratic minority, circulated draft legislation commanding the Federal Re- 
serve to reduce interest rates. Senator Baker, leader of the Republican minority, 
did not support this legislation but was deeply concerned about the Federal 
Reserve’s tight policy and reportedly expressed those concerns directly and 
repeatedly to Chairman Volcker. 
Senior administration  officials, both in the White House and at the Treasury, 
generally shared the view that the Federal Reserve was keeping monetary pol- 
icy too tight for too long. A consensus to force the Federal Reserve to relax its 
policy never developed either among senior officials in the administration or 
in the Congress. However, there can be little doubt that, had Ronald Reagan 
pulled on his cowboy boots and led a lynch mob from the south lawn of the 
White House down to Federal Reserve headquarters on Constitution Avenue, 
he would have been joined not only by the members of his administration but 
also by majorities from both parties in both houses of Congress, by the Wash- 
ington representatives of  a vast array of American businesses, and by  a fair 
number of foreign diplomats, particularly from heavily indebted countries. 
For whatever reasons, Ronald Reagan did not do that. Instead, he cam- 
paigned through the dark and difficult days of the recession of  1981-82  on the 
slogan “Stay the Course.” 
2.8  Lessons from Defeat and Victory 
In the early 1930s,  the Federal Reserve made the Great Mistake. It failed to 
resist, as actively and effectively as it could, the massive contraction of  the 
money supply between late 1929 and early 1933, thereby contributing to the 
financial and economic devastation of the Great Depression and to all the hor- 
rors it helped engender. In the late 1960s and the 197Os, the Federal Reserve 
made smaller but still important errors in the other direction. After contributing 
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late 1960s, in the early 1970s, and again in the late 1970s, the Federal Reserve 
waited so long to take effective corrective action that the consequence was an 
unnecessarily deep and prolonged recession. 
In particular, during 1977 and 1978, monetary policy helped fuel the resur- 
gence of inflation. The initial efforts to combat rising inflation beginning in 
November 1978 were too timid. By the summer of  1979, in the face of  the 
second oil price shock, it became clear that the timid initial efforts to combat 
rising inflation were ineffective and unpersuasive. Then, when the Federal Re- 
serve finally did forcefully confront the inflationary demon in late 1979 and 
early 1980, it retreated at the first sign of significant casualties, before the battle 
had been won. 
With its credibility badly damaged by its own past errors, the Federal Re- 
serve rejoined the battle in November 1980 and, at the cost of a deep and 
prolonged recession, fought through to a convincing victory. Subsequently 
during the 1980s,  the Federal Reserve successfully conducted a monetary pol- 
icy that  supported an exceptionally long and relatively vigorous economic 
expansion, without a substantial rise in the rate of inflation. Three important 
lessons can be learned, and apparently have been learned, from this experience. 
2.8.1  Three Main Lessons 
First, once the inflationary process has built substantial momentum and the 
credibility of the central bank has been impaired, it takes a determined tight- 
ening of monetary policy to reduce significantly the rate of inflation and restore 
confidence in a greater degree of future price stability. In principle, it might be 
hoped that a gradual, persistent tightening of monetary policy would control 
and ultimately diminish inflation without precipitating an economic downturn. 
However, experience indicates that a recession of significant depth and dura- 
tion is the virtually inevitable consequence of  a successful attack on deeply 
entrenched inflation. Efforts to avoid recession by stabilizing inflation once it 
has risen to a relatively high rate do not have a happy history. Under such a 
policy of monetary appeasement, the natural tendency is for the inflation rate 
to be ratcheted upward in a never-ending spiral toward hyperinflation. 
Ultimately, there is no escape from the short-term economic damage of  a 
determined effort to reduce inflation. The only option is postponement, which 
makes both the problem of  inflation and the pain of  its cure far worse. The 
Federal Reserve demonstrated that it learned this important lesson (perhaps 
too well) when it pursued a very tight policy for twenty-one months from No- 
vember 1980 to August 1982. Implicitly, it accepted that a deep and prolonged 
recession was the necessary cost of gaining an important victory over the en- 
trenched inflation that .was largely the consequence of its own earlier policies. 
Second, as a corollary of the first lesson, it is a serious mistake for monetary 
policy to allow the inflationary process to build substantial momentum before 
determined action is taken to curb the rise of inflation. Such action is likely to 
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ever, it is generally better to take moderate risks in this direction before infla- 
tionary pressures rise significantly than to delay action until a serious economic 
downturn becomes the likely consequence of necessary monetary tightening. 
The Federal Reserve demonstrated its command of this lesson when it tight- 
ened monetary policy during 1984, during the first nine months of  1987, and 
again during most of  1988 and 1989. It remains, of  course, an open issue 
whether the Federal Reserve went too far, or not quite far enough, in its recent 
tightening of monetary policy. Regardless of the outcome, however, it is appar- 
ent that the Federal Reserve is not disposed to repeat the same mistakes of the 
late 1960s and the 1970s. 
Third, there is no unique quantitative guide to the monetary policy that best 
serves the generally agreed on and intrinsically  related objectives of promoting 
maximum sustainable economic growth and assuring reasonable price stabil- 
ity. Instead, the central bank needs to examine a variety of  indicators of  the 
current and prospective performance of  the economy and to assess several 
measures of  the stance of  its own monetary policy. This view-that  the con- 
duct of  monetary policy requires judgment and discretion-has  always gov- 
erned the conduct of the Federal Reserve. Even during the period of relatively 
serious targeting of  growth rates of monetary aggregates from October 1979 
until the summer of  1982, the Federal Reserve was always looking at the per- 
formance of the economy and developments in financial markets in deciding 
on its policy. 
The lesson of the late 1970s and the 1980s is that, in the turbulent and uncer- 
tain conditions likely to accompany a successful attack on entrenched inflation, 
there is no alternative  to discretion in the conduct of monetary policy. There is 
also no escape from the responsibility to exercise that discretion wisely. On 
the basis of  this experience, however, it remains an open question whether a 
more “rule-based” approach to the exercise of  discretion in the conduct of 
monetary policy would more successfully avoid the problems of  entrenched 
inflation or prolonged economic downturn. 
2.8.2  The Meaning of Discretion 
Economists have long disputed the virtues of “rules versus discretion” in the 
conduct of monetary policy-fundamentally  a religious controversy, intrinsi- 
cally related to the age-old dispute over free will versus prede~tination.’~  On 
19. Following the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and of Robert Barro and David Gordon 
(1983), the recent academic literature has usually formulated the distinction between “rules and 
discretion” in terms of the ability of the monetary authority to precommit its policy in some spe- 
cific and enforceable manner. In practice, it is questionable whether this distinction is very mean- 
ingful or useful. The economic variables that are really of interest to the public and their elected 
representatives  (real economic growth, employment, and inflation) are not entirely under the con- 
trol of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve could not realistically commit its policy to deliver 
specific outcomes for these variables. On the other hand, it is far from clear that the public would 
want specific commitments for those variables that the Federal Reserve can totally control if the 
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this issue, a highly relevant observation was made by Winston Churchill in his 
autobiography,  My Early Years: “My conclusion upon Free Will and Predesti- 
nation .  . . ,  let the reader mark it, .  . .  they are identical.” 
Similarly, if there is a “rule” for monetary policy, then whoever writes it can 
revise it and whoever implements it must interpret it. Inevitably, some element 
of discretion infects every “monetary rule.” Equally inevitably, the “discretion- 
ary” conduct of monetary policy is not whimsical and haphazard. The effort is 
always to achieve the desired outcome on the basis of what experience suggests 
to be the relation between actions taken and results achieved. Without some 
degree of consistency and regularity, there is no meaningful monetary policy. 
Thus, there is no sharp, clean distinction between “rules and discretion” but 
rather a muddy issue of the reliance to place on particular relations and indica- 
tors in guiding the actual conduct of monetary policy. 
In this regard, the experience of  the late 1970s and the 1980s powerfully 
illustrated the failure of interest rates to provide a continuously reliable guide 
for the conduct of monetary policy. From 1976  through 1979, the Federal funds 
rate was pushed up in a series of steps to levels that would have indicated a 
quite tight monetary policy in the context of  the 1960s. However, during much 
of this period, the inflation rate was moving upward as fast as or faster than 
the Federal funds rate, and the Federal Reserve was falling behind the curve in 
its efforts to combat the rise of inflation. The level of the Federal funds rate, 
by itself, failed to provide a reliable indicator of the stance of monetary policy. 
During the period of very tight monetary policy, from November 1980 until 
July 1982, the level of  the Federal funds rate was generally very high both 
absolutely and in comparison with the rate of inflation. This fact, together with 
information about the performance of the economy and the slow growth of the 
narrow monetary aggregate MIA, correctly indicated a very tight monetary 
policy. However, for much of  the period from the summer of  1982 through 
late 1986, the performance of the economy and the growth of the monetary 
aggregates indicated a relatively easy monetary policy. During this period, the 
Federal funds rate also generally remained well above the inflation rate. By the 
standards of the 1960s or 1970s, the level of the Federal funds rate, adjusted 
for inflation, would have suggested a very tight monetary policy. Thus, even in 
combination with the inflation rate, the Federal funds rate failed to provide a 
unique and completely reliable indicator of the stance of monetary policy. 
On the basis of the experience of the late 1970s and the 1980s, similar con- 
In the academic literature, there is also the notion that the problem with “discretion” is that the 
monetary authority cannot avoid the temptation to use it to  surprise the public with greater than 
anticipated inflation in order to drive output and employment above their sustainable equilibrium 
levels. The practical  relevance of this notion is also highly questionable. The  Federal  Reserve 
made mistakes in allowing inflation to build up momentum in the late 1960s and the 1970s. It was 
sometimes too timid in attacking inflation because of concern about the consequences for output 
and employment. However, there is little factual support for the accusation that  the Federal Re- 







cerns apply to the use of monetary aggregates as the unique indicators of mon- 
etary policy. The key to the usefulness of  monetary aggregates is a stable, 
highly predictable relation between the behavior of these aggregates and the 
behavior of economic variables of more fundamental interest, especially real 
GNP, the price level, and nominal GNP. As illustrated in figure 2.10, for the 
twenty years prior to 1980, the velocity of M1-the  ratio of nominal GNP to 
M1-exhibited  a relatively stable, 3 percent trend rate of growth. After 1980, 
this apparently stable relation between M1 (= MlB) and nominal GNP col- 
lapsed, with velocity declining sharply in the early 1980s and then remaining 
essentially flat, on balance, for the remainder of the decade. Clearly, a mone- 
tary policy that targeted the growth rate of M1 on the assumption of a 3 percent 
annual rate of increase in its velocity would have gone seriously, perhaps cata- 
strophically, awry during the 1980s. 
For M2, the trend behavior of velocity has remained essentially flat in the 
1980s. However, there have been relatively large annual fluctuations in M2 
velocity (i.e., fluctuations of 3 or 4 percent) that indicate that strict targeting 
of the growth rate of this aggregate would, on some occasions, have created 
serious difficulties. 
Moreover, the usefulness of monetary aggregates as indicators of monetary 
policy is seriously impaired when the growth rates of these aggregates give 
disparate signals about the stance of monetary policy, as happened at several 
points during the 1980s.  In particular, looking at the critical period of the battle 
against inflation from late 1980 through mid-1982, the growth rate of M2, 
illustrated in figure 2.6 above, does not by  itself indicate a particularly tight 
monetary policy. Indeed, the growth rate of M2 during this period was margin- 
ally higher than the growth rate of M2 from early 1977 until October 1979, 
when, judged by the actual behavior of the price level, monetary policy was 
not firmly anti-inflationary. In comparison, the growth rates of  M1 (= new 
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M1B) and especially of MIA (= old Ml), both illustrated in figure 2.5 above, 
indicate a significantly tighter monetary policy from late 1980 to mid-1982 
than during the late 1970s. Another example of significant disparity in growth 
rates of different monetary aggregates occurs in 1985 and 1986. The growth 
rate of M2 during this two-year period is only marginally higher than during 
the period of tight monetary policy from late 1980 to mid-1982. In contrast, 
M1 grows at an exceptionally rapid pace during 1985-86,  both in comparison 
with the period of tight monetary policy during 1981-82  and in comparison 
with the period of rising inflation during the late 1970s. 
Of course, monetarists would argue that much of the disparity in the growth 
rates, and many of the movements in velocities, of different aggregates during 
the 1980s can be explained by movements in interest rates and by  shifts into 
and out of  newly created classes of deposits. Granted that this is correct, it 
does not controvert the fundamental lesson that some degree of  discretion is 
required in the conduct of monetary policy. The only way to remove discretion 
completely would be to specify a precise and invariant definition of the mone- 
tary aggregate to be targeted and a rate at which this aggregate should be made 
to grow, month in and month out, regardless of virtually any condition or cir- 
cumstance short of thermonuclear war. The experience of the 1980s indicates 
that there are situations in which this sort of discretionless  monetary rule would 
perform rather poorly. 
2.8.3 
Given the inevitability of some degree of discretion in the conduct of U.S. 
monetary policy, it remains relevant to ask what emphasis should be given to 
monetary growth rates in guiding the Federal Reserve’s policy. On this issue, 
the lessons of  the  1970s and the  1980s are somewhat ambiguous. As pre- 
viously discussed, strict targeting of monetary aggregates would have encoun- 
tered severe difficulties in the turbulent economic and financial environment 
of the early 1980s. On the other hand, it is clear that the Federal Reserve would 
have avoided most of the error of contributing to the buildup of inflationary 
pressures during the late 1970s if it had been more assiduous in achieving its 
own announced monetary growth targets. Under those circumstances,  much of 
the economic and financial turbulence associated with the determined effort to 
reduce inflation during the early 1980s might have been avoided, and monetary 
targeting might have proved more successful throughout the period. 
More generally, it may be argued that, in conducting a discretionary mone- 
tary policy, the Federal Reserve generally needs to pay considerable attention, 
in a careful and sophisticated way, to the behavior of  monetary aggregates. 
Some prominent  monetarists have  suggested that  an  “adjusted  monetary 
growth rule” would provide an especially valuable guide for monetary policy.2O 
The adjustments would take the form of  a moving average correction for 
20. Allan Meltzer and Bennett McCallum are leading  advocates of  some form of adjustable 
monetary rule. Meltzer’s views are presented in several papers (see, e.g.,  Meltzer 1987, 1991). For 
McCallum’s arguments, see McCallum (1988). 
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changes in  the relation between monetary growth and the rate of  growth of 
nominal GIW. The virtue of such a “rule” is that it would help prevent the big 
errors of monetary policy: avoiding the persistent declines in the money supply 
that contributed to the Great Depression of the early 1930s and avoiding the 
excessive monetary growth that contributed to the rise of inflation in the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
At least in my view, the usefulness of such a monetary rule is not as the sole 
guide to the operational conduct of monetary policy but rather as a medium- 
term indicator that policy may be deviating from the desired course. The “rule” 
provides a warning signal against the danger of too much emphasis on interest 
rates and on shorter-term economic developments and forecasts in governing 
the conduct of monetary policy. 
To illustrate the possible virtue of  giving somewhat greater emphasis to 
monetary growth rates in guiding the medium-term conduct of monetary pol- 
icy, it is relevant to examine,  retrospectively, whether this might have improved 
economic performance. Because demand for the narrow monetary aggregate 
MIA (= old M1) is less sensitive to movements in interest rates than the 
broader aggregates,  it is convenient to focus attention on this narrow aggregate. 
As was recognized at the time, it is necessary to adjust for the downward shift 
in demand for M1 A when interest-bearing transactions accounts (not included 
in M1A) became widely available to households in 1980 and 1981. With these 
adjustments, M1 appears to provide useful indications that might have guided 
improvements in monetary policy. 
In the late 1970s, MIA was growing at rates that indicated a relatively easy 
monetary policy, especially in light of the normal upward trend (for the preced- 
ing twenty-five years) in the velocity of this aggregate. Giving a little more 
weight to the growth of M1A in determining  monetary policy in the late 1970s 
would have suggested a somewhat earlier and more vigorous attack on infla- 
tion. The slowdown in the growth of  MIA in the autumn of  1979 and the 
winter of 1980 provided an appropriate indication of the necessary tightening 
of  monetary policy to combat the surge of  inflation at that time. The sharp 
upturn of growth of M1A during that summer and early autumn of  1980 pro- 
vided an accurate indication of the Federal Reserve’s unfortunate retreat from 
the battle against the demon of inflation. Making appropriate allowance for the 
shift of households out of traditional demand deposits, the very tight monetary 
policy from November 1980 to July-August  1982 is also clearly indicated by 
the behavior of MIA. Had the Federal Reserve taken this indicator more seri- 
ously, it would not perhaps have pursued quite such a tight policy for quite so 
long, and the recession of 1981-82  might not have been quite as deep and quite 
as long. 
The sharp increase in the growth rate of M1A in late summer and autumn 
1982 dramatically illustrated the shift to a much easier monetary policy. The 
gradually declining, but still moderately high, rate of growth of M 1A until the 
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while the sharp downturn in M1A growth later in the year indicates the brief 
period of monetary tightening. In retrospect, it seems that a modestly less easy 
monetary policy during late 1982 and  1983, which would have  contributed 
somewhat less to the extraordinarily rapid pace of economic expansion from 
late 1982 to mid-1984, might have been appropriate. It might also have obvi- 
ated the need for monetary tightening during 1984 that hit the economy at 
about the same time as the natural forces of economic recovery were abating. 
During 1985 and especially 1986, the rapid growth of MIA indicated a sub- 
stantial easing of  monetary policy. Then, the sharp decline in the growth of 
M 1  A indicated an abrupt tightening of monetary policy during the first half of 
1987, and the negative growth of M1A indicated further tightening  just before 
the stock market crash. After a brief  period of  easing during the first few 
months of 1988, the growth rate of M1A indicated a very significant tightening 
of monetary policy from April 1988 through July 1989, followed by a modest 
degree of easing in the last quarter of  1989. Looking back at the very rapid 
real growth of the economy during 1987 (which is apparent especially in the 
revised data), it is relevant to ask whether a somewhat less expansionary mone- 
tary policy during 1986 might not have contributed to a more moderate pace 
of economic growth during 1987, thereby alleviating some of  the need for 
monetary tightening in 1987 and conceivably in 1988-89.  Again, taking more 
seriously the behavior of M1A as a guide for monetary policy might have con- 
tributed  to  a  somewhat  smoother, more  sustainable course  of  economic 
expansion. 
To  avoid misunderstanding,  it should be reemphasized that the issue is not 
whether the Federal Reserve should have set a specific target for the growth of 
MIA as the operational guide for monetary policy in the 1980s. Rather, the 
question is whether, at the margin, monetary policy might have been improved 
if somewhat more attention  had been paid to the signals provided by the growth 
rate of  MlA, within the context of the array of  factors that guided Federal 
Reserve policy. Indeed, as previously discussed, rigid targeting of growth rates 
of  monetary aggregates can lead to serious difficulties in the turbulent eco- 
nomic and financial environment of a determined assault on entrenched infla- 
tion. In these situations, the Federal Reserve faced tough decisions about how 
long to pursue a tight monetary policy in order to curb inflation,  without highly 
reliable indicators of the actual tightness of  its policy or of the likely future 
course of the economy. Careful judgment, rather than a mechanistic rule, was 
required to determine the most appropriate policy. Of course, with an appro- 
priate monetary policy, difficult decisions about harsh actions to combat rising 
inflation should be an infrequent necessity. However, there is no guarantee, and 
no automatic rule, that assures that such decisions can always be avoided or 
that they will always be made wisely. 
As the experience of the 1980s makes clear, real people and their elected 
representatives care a good deal about the growth of the economy, about the 
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rates. Intrinsically, they care little about growth rates of monetary aggregates. 
The only occasion on which the monetary growth rates became a subject of 
significant public interest was during the early 1980s, when the Federal Re- 
serve was believed to be paying significant attention to these growth rates in 
determining its policy with respect to interest rates. Once the Federal Reserve 
effectively abandoned operating procedures that attempted to achieve targeted 
growth rates for monetary aggregates, general public interest in monetary 
growth rates waned rapidly. The implication is that, so long as monetary policy 
contributes to acceptable behavior of the economic variables that really matter 
to real people, the Federal Reserve is unlikely to be held publicly accountable 
for deviations of  monetary growth rates from specified targets. Rather, such 
technical issues regarding the conduct of monetary policy-important  as they 
may  be-will  remain primarily the domain of  specialists who analyze and 
assess the Federal Reserve’s performance. 
Ultimately, it is the performance of monetary policy with respect to its in- 
fluence on growth, employment, inflation, and other economic variables of real 
importance for which the Federal Reserve can and should be held responsible. 
The task  of  assessing the Federal Reserve’s performance, however, is not 
simple-primarily  because the Federal Reserve’s job is not simple. Monetary 
policy is far from the only important influence on economic activity or even 
on inflation. The Federal Reserve must conduct its policy without precise in- 
formation about the ongoing behavior of the economy or, especially, about its 
likely future behavior. On some occasions through no fault of its own, and on 
some occasions because of past errors of its own policy, the Federal Reserve 
will confront choices with no happy outcomes. Moreover, even when monetary 
policy is tuned appropriately, a tension always exists between good arguments 
that the policy should be a little tighter and good arguments that it should be a 
little easier. Almost inevitably, the Federal Reserve will get somewhat more 
than its fair share of praise when the economy performs well and somewhat 
more than its fair share of blame when the economy performs badly. Fortu- 
nately for us all, for most of the decade of the 1980s, the Federal Reserve has 
been more deserving of thankful applause than of harsh criticism. 
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2.  PaulA. Volcker 
Martin Feldstein asked me to comment on some of the significant events in 
monetary policy during my tenure as chairman of the Federal Reserve. I think 
that there are five periods that deserve particular comment: the Federal Re- 
serve’s adoption of a more monetarist approach to policy-making in 1979; the 
credit controls and recession of 1980; the relaxation of monetary policy begin- 
ning in late 1982; the Plaza Accord in September 1985; and the Louvre meet- 
ing in February 1987. 
Let me begin in late 1979, when I went to Washington. Michael Mussa’s 
background paper accurately describes the setting for monetary policy at that 
time. Inflationary expectations seemed to be rising, as there was little confi- 
dence in the financial markets that the Federal Reserve would effectively re- 
strain an increase in inflation. One part of  the problem, I believe, was that 
banks had lost any fear that they might ever be unable to raise funds for lend- 
ing. The interest rate limit for large certificates of  deposit had been removed 
in June 1979, and the banks thought that there was no constraint on their ability 
to obtain credit. Although the cost of funds to banks was high, the inflationary 
environment meant that the banks did not let this high cost deter them from 
continued lending. 
Ironically, despite these inflationary expectations, there was also an  expecta- 
tion that a recession was starting. For several months before the summer of 
1979, the Federal Reserve staff had been projecting that a recession would 
begin shortly. 
Then the Federal Reserve raised the discount rate twice between July and 
September 1979. Unfortunately, although these discount rate increases raised 
short-term interest rates somewhat, they had virtually no effect on the psycho- 
logical environment. In fact, and much to my surprise, the second increase was 
actually counterproductive. That increase was adopted by a four-to-three vote, 
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as implying that the Federal Reserve was obviously not going to undertake 
any further tightening measures. Ordinarily, I might have been sensitive to that 
interpretation because one does like to have more of a consensus on shifts in 
policy. In this case, however, I was not concerned because I knew that I had 
three other votes if I wanted to tighten again. So it had not occurred to me in 
advance that the closeness of the vote would be a problem. 
This event was one of the things that persuaded me that the Federal Reserve 
needed to pursue a strategy that would “shake up” the inflationary psychology 
and introduce some constructive  uncertainty in financial markets. The strategy 
that we pursued-moving  to a more monetarist approach to policy-making- 
had been the subject of endless analysis and debate at the Federal Reserve, and 
I had begun thinking about it earlier when I was still in New York. As I dis- 
cussed the desirability of such a strategy as a means of dealing with expecta- 
tions, there was enthusiastic support among both the Board members and the 
district bank presidents. I think that it is fair to say that the Carter administra- 
tion was not enthusiastic. Members of the administration argued that the Fed- 
eral Reserve should not launch this uncertain new approach, with unknown 
consequences, but should instead, if really necessary, tighten policy more se- 
verely in a more orthodox way. 
Nevertheless, the change in policy was announced in early October 1979. I 
thought that there were two great advantages of the monetarist approach, which 
I had emphasized in some earlier speeches. First, it was a good way of disci- 
plining ourselves.  When we had announced that we were going to meet certain 
money supply targets, and not by manipulating interest rates but by working 
directly through the reserve base, we were committing a lot of prestige to that 
commitment, and it would have been very hard to rationalize a retreat. Second, 
it seemed to be a good device, given the spirit of the times, to convey what we 
were doing to the public. We said, in effect, that the United States was experi- 
encing high inflation that needed to be dealt with and that inflation is a mone- 
tary phenomenon. Thus, we were not going to try to reduce inflation by manip- 
ulating interest rates but were instead going to go directly to the money supply. 
That seemed like a good way  to explain what we were doing in a way  that 
people could understand and support. 
I did not expect at the time that interest rates would move as much as they 
did. Although we were working directly through reserves, we had established 
a wide band for the Federal funds rate and had agreed to reconsider our actions 
whenever the rate reached either end of this band. I thought that we should 
take this band seriously, but most members of  the Open Market Committee 
were less conservative than I was on this point, and in the end the restriction 
was not very meaningful. Whenever the Federal funds rate reached the end of 
the band, there was a telephone meeting to ask whether the current policy 
should be continued, and the answer was always yes. As time passed, even less 
attention was paid to this band. So interest rates rose further and more rapidly 
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expectational  effects on long-term interest rates. While the money supply itself 
behaved reasonably in line with our targets over the rest of 1979,  it experienced 
a great deal of  volatility. Also, there was little visible effect at that stage on 
either economic activity or inflation, the earlier projections of recession not- 
withstanding. 
The next significant period for monetary policy was early in 1980. Inflation 
had been running at a double-digit  rate for several months, creating a true sense 
of  inflationary crisis. President Carter then proposed a budget with a deficit 
that by  today’s standards was small but was considered outrageously inade- 
quate to the anti-inflationary challenge at the time. The budget was, in a sense, 
withdrawn. The Federal Reserve took some tightening measures but delayed 
others because we wanted to have a coordinated program with the new budget. 
At this time, the president decided that consumer credit controls should be 
imposed. He realized that some restraint on spending was necessary, and he 
wanted the restraint to come not just from higher interest rates but also from 
direct control over consumer credit. He became convinced that such a step 
would send the message to the public that he was serious about reducing in- 
flation. 
We  at the Federal Reserve resisted the imposition of consumer credit con- 
trols, partly because of the usual problems associated with rationing and partly 
because consumer credit was not rising very fast and did not seem to be the 
source of the inflationary pressures. There was a law on the books, however, 
that said that the president could, in effect, give the Federal Reserve the author- 
ity to impose consumer credit controls. I thought that it would be awkward, to 
say the least, for the president to give us the authority to impose controls and 
then for us to say that we were not going to impose them anyway. In the end, I 
felt that we could not talk the president out of the credit controls, and we had 
to recognize that he was taking politically difficult steps to cut government 
spending and was willing to accept and even support further monetary tight- 
ening without complaint. 
So we agreed to impose controls on consumer credit, although we made 
those controls as mild as we possibly could. We exempted anything to do with 
housing and automobiles, which are by  far the most important elements of 
consumer credit. In effect, we put a tax on credit cards, a psychological gesture 
that we thought would not amount to much. We were completely wrong, how- 
ever, as the idea of cutting back on consumer credit apparently touched a guilty 
nerve in the American public. The country went immediately into recession, 
with the economy declining at a faster rate than we first realized. 
Businesses selling consumer goods that were usually sold on credit faced 
huge sales declines even when their products were not actually covered by the 
credit controls. I recall some recreational vehicle dealers who had a two-thirds 
decline in sales from one week to the next. The result was that the economy 
dropped precipitously, and I realized in retrospect that I had never seen any- 
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We  soon discovered that the money supply was dropping precipitously at 
the same time. We were providing reserves at a rate that normally would have 
sustained a 3 or 4  percent annual increase in the money supply, but in fact the 
money supply actually declined for a month or two at a high annual rate. Only 
later could we hypothesize not only that consumers were refusing to take on 
additional credit, but also that they were repaying their outstanding credit card 
balances because they felt that it was the patriotic thing to do. The repayment 
was accomplished by  a reduction in bank account balances, which created a 
totally artificial decline in the money supply. 
This decline in the money supply provoked a chorus of  comments from 
economists-monetarists  and Keynesians alike-to  the effect that the Federal 
Reserve needed to provide additional reserves to the banking system. At the 
same time, of course, there was a very steep decline in economic activity for 
one quarter. So we took off the credit controls as soon as we could because I 
thought that they were inappropriate when the economy was in a recession. 
I think that there was no sense during the summer of  1980  that the economy 
was recovering. I remember meeting at that time with a group of leading bank- 
ers who were in Washington for some other purpose. I was starting to think 
that the sinking spell in the economy was ending, although I had no sense of a 
strong recovery. I asked the bankers whether they thought that they might look 
back in October or November and say that by the end of September the econ- 
omy was reviving. Not one of  those bankers said that they thought that that 
was at all possible. In fact, while we were having the meeting, the economy 
had already been expanding for a month or two, and quite a lot of momentum 
soon developed. 
The money supply also began to increase during the summer, although from 
a very low level. Initially, we did not move to restrain the rebound in the money 
supply because the level remained well below our targets. We  did take some 
action beginning in August, but many people argue in retrospect that we did 
not act aggressively enough to restrain the growth of money in the latter part 
of  1980. The fact is that, for some months, neither we nor our subsequent 
critics realized that the economy was rebounding as fast as it was. All the staff 
projections of the money supply were for modest increases; in fact, we ended 
up with very large increases. This put us in the awkward position of having to 
tighten money in the face of  a presidential election campaign. Jimmy Carter 
was complaining (although in a very limited way, to his credit) about “mone- 
tarism” and rising interest rates, while Ronald Reagan was complaining about 
the wild expansion of  the money supply. We  did increase the discount rate 
around the end of  September, which is historically the closest to an election 
that the discount rate has ever been increased. 
In retrospect, however, monetary policy seems too expansionary during this 
short period. The money supply rose rapidly until October or November, when 
we tightened more aggressively and here able to get it under control. It was in 
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main reason, it seems to me, was the complications introduced by  the credit 
controls. This is a useful lesson. The unexpected psychological repercussions 
of that inherently mild action-the  way the American public responded at that 
time to that gesture-were  completely out of proportion to what we expected. 
We would not have had such a steep drop in the money supply or in the econ- 
omy except for the controls. 
The next interesting event was the easing of monetary policy in 1982. The 
recession had begun in mid- 198 1, but we did not adopt a strongly expansionary 
monetary policy until the summer of  1982. There were several reasons for our 
cautious stance in the first half of that year. First, there was a big jump in the 
money supply around the beginning of  1982 that carried it above our targets. 
Under the new approach and operating techniques, that development was not 
conducive to any aggressive moves to ease money. Second, although the econ- 
omy was  in  a recession, inflation had not fallen very much by  early 1982. 
Third, there were substantial expectations, generally shared within the Fed, 
that the economy would begin to expand in the second quarter of the year, I 
believe that the initial estimates of the second quarter did in fact show a small 
expansion, although that was  later revised away.  In studying the history of 
monetary policy, one must remember the difference between the revised fig- 
ures available now and the unrevised figures available at the time. In the spring 
of  1982, we were operating in an environment in which we thought that the 
economy was probably beginning to recover, and the money supply remained 
somewhat above our targets. 
However, this confidence in an imminent expansion became more and more 
questionable as the spring proceeded. The financial markets were under in- 
creasing pressure as well; this was an important background factor, although 
not the driving force, behind our eventual decision to ease. Sometime in July, 
as I recall, after the money supply had been stable for a long period, it finally 
fell back into our target ranges after its big jump at the beginning of the year. 
At this point, we decided that we could ease credibly, and we made some lim- 
ited easing movements, the effects of which on interest rates were greatly am- 
plified by  market expectations, producing a solid decline. The stock market 
surged. 
By the fall of 1982, the money supply began rising rapidly again. The money 
supply figures were clearly being distorted by the new money market accounts 
and other institutional changes, so this provided the occasion for an announce- 
ment that we were not going to follow M1 as religiously as we had been doing. 
In particular, we were not going to institute contractionary policy simply be- 
cause the money supply figures were rising, and, in  fact, we made another 
important easing move in the fall. By the end of the year, a strong recovery was 
under way. 
Now let me turn to the Plaza Accord of  1985. This is an important event to 
discuss because the implications of the accord for monetary policy were the 
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The dollar had reached a peak in early 1985, and there was continuing de- 
bate both in the United States and overseas about exchange market interven- 
tion. Treasury Secretary James Baker and Deputy Secretary Richard Darman 
were more inclined to intervene than previous Treasury officials had been, and 
the meeting at the Plaza was largely at their initiative. I well understood the 
arguments for reducing the value of  the dollar and had pleaded many times 
earlier for agreement on coordinated intervention.  But I also held a good, tradi- 
tional central banking view that countries deliberately depreciating their cur- 
rencies often run afoul of inflation. I feared that the dollar decline might get 
out of hand, and I was simply not enthusiastic about an official doctrine that it 
is good to depreciate one’s currency. So I wanted the decline in the dollar to be 
pursued without undue aggressiveness, and we had great arguments about how 
to do that. In the end, I think that my views about how to implement the inter- 
vention were largely accepted. 
But the central question for today is, What were the implications of the ac- 
cord for monetary policy? I read a lot of  analysis that says that the Federal 
Reserve would have preferred to tighten policy for domestic purposes but was 
forced into a looser policy in order to help bring down the dollar. That is not 
true. By 1985,  I was quite concerned that the U.S. economy was slowing down, 
and the Japanese and European economies were very sluggish as well. There 
was no doubt in my mind that it was not the right time to tighten policy. In 
fact, it was the absence of any need or desire to tighten that provided a “green 
light” for the Plaza Agreement. Indeed, there was substantial argument with 
the Fed in favor of loosened monetary policy for domestic purposes, but one 
reason that I opposed that action was because I did not want the dollar to fall 
in value too suddenly or confidence in our anti-inflationary resolve to be under- 
cut. Thus, concern about the value of the dollar caused monetary policy to be 
shaded more on the tighter side during late 1985 than on the easier side, al- 
though that shading was evident in a refusal to ease rather than an actual tight- 
ening. I emphasize this point because it is just the opposite of what most com- 
mentators were saying at the time and have been saying more recently as well. 
Finally, let me discuss the Louvre Accord of early 1987. During the summer 
of  1986, James Baker and I engaged in an ongoing public dialogue about the 
appropriate value of the dollar. He would say that he wanted the dollar to fall 
in value. My sense was that it had fallen enough, and I was afraid that it would 
be too weak, so I would testify the following day that I thought that its current 
value was just fine. We  finally decided that he could say what he wanted and I 
could say what I wanted, and this was not particularly acrimonious because it 
had a favorable side effect-while  the dollar continued to decline some, the 
contrasting approaches injected some uncertainty into the market, which pre- 
vented matters from getting out of hand. As the dollar remained weak, how- 
ever, Treasury Department officials became more concerned about it. They ar- 
ranged for the Louvre meeting, which was designed to reach an international 
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At neither the Louvre meeting nor the Plaza meeting was there any explicit 
discussion of monetary policy. This may be surprising from the standpoint of 
economic analysis, but it is not surprisingly bureaucratically or as a matter of 
international  diplomacy. The central bankers had no desire to discuss monetary 
policy in that essentially political setting at the .risk of tying their hands in the 
future. And the finance ministers felt that they could not press the point. The 
Germans in particular were very punctilious, with the people from the Finance 
Ministry believing that it was the Bundesbank’s  job to discuss monetary policy. 
The central bankers, quite naturally, preferred to discuss monetary policy is- 
sues “outside the room” and in other forums, but often they  were not very 
explicit even then. In fact, big changes in monetary policy were not an issue at 
the Louvre. There was a lot of communication on a continuing basis afterward, 
but it was more in regard to intervention and exchange rates than to monetary 
policy per  se. I think that everyone understood that the Plaza and Louvre 
agreements obviously had consequences for monetary policy, but that was all. 
At both the Plaza meeting and the Louvre meeting, there were very explicit, 
painstakingly  detailed  discussions  about  who  would  intervene,  in  what 
amounts, and under what circumstances. Most of this discussion irritated me 
because I thought that it was very artificial-one  cannot anticipate all the pos- 
sible contingencies and determine who should do what in response. Neverthe- 
less, there was a lot of discussion of that sort. 
3. James Tobin 
Speaking about Paul Volcker right after Paul Volcker, I am not in an enviable 
position. Imagine an academic critic following Douglas MacArthur in a retro- 
spective discussion of the general’s campaigns. 
I shall discuss only briefly the three years from October 1979, the period of 
serious quantitative medium-run targets for monetary aggregates and of short- 
run operating targets for quantities of reserves. History will confirm the praise 
that Paul Volcker earned from his contemporaries for his resolute generalship 
of the war against the inflation of the late 1970s. The recessions did not reduce 
inflation to zero, but they did lower it to a comfortable  rate, 4-5 percent, which 
proved to be stable during the subsequent cyclical expansion. 
In 1979-80, many economists contended that the way monetary policymak- 
ers could bring about a relatively rapid and painless disinflation would be to 
announce strict monetarist targets and operating procedures and to commit 
themselves to stick with them regardless of what happened to business activity 
and employment. Thus, business managers and workers would be put on notice 
that their livelihoods and jobs depend on their own price and wage decisions- 
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mate of  opinion in the Federal Reserve System and the financial markets. I 
gather that it was not as important in Volcker’s own thinking as the need to 
obtain and display consensus in the system for a policy move appropriate to 
prevailing economic conditions. 
If  a “credible threat” was intended in the October 1979 revolution, it was 
attenuated by  the policy roller coaster in  1980, severely criticized by Mike 
Mussa in his background paper and unapologetically reviewed by Paul in his 
remarks. Why Carter’s credit controls were so powerful a restraint on aggregate 
demand and on money supplies remains a mystery. Evidently,  their effects both 
on imposition and on removal greatly confused the Fed. Anyway, beginning in 
September 1980, a determined monetarist policy was followed for nearly two 
years. Did the policy make the disinflation faster and less painful than it would 
have been otherwise? The economic literature renders a mixed verdict. Cer- 
tainly, it took substantial pain and suffering, not just threat, to get wage and 
price inflation rates down. 
Was there any way  to limit the cost? Some economists, myself included, 
had suggested combining the announcement of a firm disinflationary monetary 
policy with some variant of incomes policy, at least guideposts. There had been 
a stab at incomes policy in the Carter administration  in 1979, but it was aban- 
doned just at the crucial time. Rumor was that this decision was related to the 
contest for the Democratic presidential nomination, specifically  to the position 
of organized labor. No incomes policy was conceivable in the new administra- 
tion, although President Reagan’s tough stand against the air traffic controllers 
in  1981 taught an exemplary lesson. One could say t!!at  the Fed itself was 
carrying out an incomes policy, albeit one that worked via actual pain and cost 
rather than by conjectural fears. 
I hope that history will give Paul and his colleagues the praise that they 
deserve not only for fighting the war against inflation but also for knowing 
when to stop, when to declare victory. They reversed course in the summer of 
1982, probably averting an accelerating contraction  of economic activity in the 
United States and financial disasters worldwide. Many observers, knowing that 
the Fed takes seriously its responsibilities for financial stability, have assumed 
that the Mexican debt crisis and other financial threats were the main consider- 
ations in the Fed’s decisions in 1982. According to Volcker, however, domestic 
nonfinancial business conditions were the main concern of the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC). 
I know that there are some hawks who thought then and think now that the 
anti-inflation  crusade should have been pursued to the bitter end and that there 
are some who would resume now the push to zero inflation. I think that it was 
an act of genius, worth trillions of dollars of GNP-yes,  real GNP-to  have 
led the country to regard 5 percent inflation as zero, and I think that it is mis- 
chievous to rock the boat now. 
The monetary management of the expansion of  the last eight years-per- 
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For the management of aggregate demand, monetary policy has been the only 
game in town since 1981. The Reagan administration  disabled fiscal policy as 
a tool of macroeconomic stabilization and dedicated it wholly to other goals, 
as discussed in other sessions of this conference. Structural budget deficits far 
beyond previous peacetime experience clouded the environment to which the 
Fed had to adapt. No doubt the economic and political implications of  the 
federal budget complicated the Fed’s decision problems. There were other new 
complexities and uncertainties: dramatically increasing international capital 
mobility; Latin American and other Third World debts; structural and regula- 
tory changes in American banking and finance; insolvencies, threatened and 
actual, among American financial institutions. 
Despite these handicaps, the Fed has been quite successful. Volcker and 
company, and then Greenspan and company, restored the reputation of  fine- 
tuning and made it into a fine art. The proof is in the pudding. The economy 
grew steadily, if  sometimes slowly, and eventually recovered the ground lost 
in the recessions. In 1988-89,  unemployment was lowered well below what 
economists considered the lowest inflation-safe rates ten years earlier. Finally, 
after managing a “soft landing” at this new and lower nonaccelerating-inflation 
rate of unemployment (NAIRU), for the last two  years the Fed has managed 
to  steer  the  economy between  the  Scylla  of  price  acceleration and  the 
Charybdis of recession. I don’t know how long that will be true, but it is true 
so far. 
Demand management cannot take major credit for the improvement in the 
NAIRU, except that the previous deep recession may have helped discipline 
subsequent wage-  and price-setting practices. Sharper foreign competition 
helped, a thin silver lining to the dark cloud of dollar appreciation.  The decline 
in oil prices prior to August 1990 was a welcome contrast to the 1970s. what- 
ever cleared the path for expansion, the Fed does get credit for following the 
path into new territory, cautiously keeping the recovery going as long as infla- 
tion remained well behaved. 
For the improved price performance of the 1980s, Mussa gives important 
weight to the new macroeconomic policy mix, loose fiscal policy and tight 
money. He echoes previous rationales for this combination. The argument is 
that the 1982-86  currency appreciation lowered the inflation rate associated 
with a given outcome in real output and employment. I am still skeptical. For 
the United States, the impact of appreciation on overall price indexes is small. 
Besides, it is temporary, essentially a loan from other countries that must be 
paid back. Later, the currency has to be depreciated, and the borrowed price 
reduction has to be reversed. Even in the short run, the gain from an apprecia- 
tion is one shot; it lowers not the rate of inflation but the level of price indexes. 
The policy mix in question has serious costs in long-run growth and foreign 
indebtedness,  costs that dwarf any small short-run macroeconomic  advantages. 
I have no inside information about how the Fed has done its fine-tuning. The 
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The new Fed monetary regime, beginning in the fall of  1982, changed both 
medium-run  targets of  policy  and  operating procedures.  Although  target 
ranges for intermediate monetary aggregates are still voted on and announced, 
as required by law, they have lost importance, as the markets know very well 
(see Mussa’s figs. 2.8 and 2.9). 
The Federal Reserve recognized that intermediate monetary aggregates had 
lost whatever meaning  they  had  because of  regulatory  and  technological 
changes in the financial industries. Downgrading the monetary targets finessed 
at least one source of error in monetary policy, unexpected (or even systematic) 
changes in velocity. Mussa’s figure 2.10 shows what happened to M1 and M2 
velocities. Liberated from the Ms, the Fed is enabled to respond to shocks that 
change velocity but not the aggregates and is excused from responding to M 
changes that simply reflect velocity shocks. Tactically, in 1982, the changing 
and uncertain meanings of the Ms gave the Fed some cover for making changes 
in policy  substance and  operating procedure that Paul and  his colleagues 
wanted to make anyway. 
The Fed has aimed directly at observed and projected macroeconomic per- 
formance, as measured not by monetary aggregates but by variables that mat- 
ter: real GNP growth; unemployment, excess capacity, and other indicators of 
slack; wage and price inflation. The weights on different measures of perfor- 
mance are not explicit; indeed, they doubtless differ among members of  the 
Open Market Committee. The bottom line is likely to be some agreed on or 
compromise range for real GNP growth, higher or lower depending on the 
weights the committee is putting on the other variables. 
Short-run operating instruments are no longer reserve quantities but, as in 
pre-1979 days, Federal funds rates. The differential between the funds rate and 
the discount rate reflects the pressure on the banks’ reserve positions. Like 
most controllers, the Fed is a feedback mechanism, changing its instrument 
settings in response to discrepancies significant in size and duration between 
actual readings and projections of  its target variables, on the one hand, and 
desired target paths, on the other. 
Not surprisingly, Federal funds rates, and other interest rates as well, have 
been less volatile since 1982 than in the preceding monetarist regime. Paul 
admits that he was astounded by their volatility in  1980-82. Most of  their re- 
cent volatility has been deliberate policy. When the Fed saw aggregate demand 
growing too slowly, the FOMC lowered the funds rate substantially (down 564 
basis points in six months from July 1982). When demand was perceived to be 
growing too fast, the FOMC raised the rate (up 205 basis points in six months 
from February 1984). Likewise, the funds rate was lowered 163 points in the 
seven months from February 1986 and raised 210 points in the eight months 
from July 1988. Other interest rates moved in the same directions, longer rates 
of course by fewer points (see Mussa’s fig. 2.4). 
In retrospect, the tightening in  1984 looks excessive to me and too long 
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of  slack left in  the economy. At the time of the February  1984 “Monetary 
Policy Report,” the Board believed that real GNP had grown 6 percent from 
1982:4, then thought to have been the recession bottom, to 1983:4 and that 
growth had slowed to 4.5 percent in 1983:4. The Fed reported that 1983 growth 
was in considerable measure due to rebuilding of inventories. The unemploy- 
ment rate was said to be down 2.5 points, but it was still about 8 percent. Wage 
and price inflation was still abating. Yet the Fed was aiming for only 4.5 per- 
cent growth in 1984, fourth quarter to fourth quarter-they  got it, now revised 
to 5 percent. (This is the only time that I found so explicit a target in a “Mone- 
tary Policy Report to Congress.” Generally, the growth target is unstated or is 
implicit in the FOMC members’ projections. In his remarks, Paul warned us 
against reading any policy intentions into those projections.) 
In most postwar recoveries, growth was 6 percent or better in the first year. 
I have never found convincing the “speed limit” theory, which argues that high 
growth rates are dangerously inflationary even in very slack economies. De- 
mand management, I think, should aim for high growth at the beginnings of 
recovery and gradually reduce stimulus as the margin of economic slack de- 
clines. The Fed’s foot was a bit heavy on the brake. 
I mention this episode because it did unintended and  unexpected long- 
lasting damage. The return of  double-digit short interest rates in mid-1984, 
raising long-term bond rates above 13 percent again, ratcheted the dollar up 
another big notch (20 percent nominal, 19 percent real, in the multilateral 
trade-weighted index). I realize that, as Paul Krugman convincingly argued, 
there must have been significant speculative content in the appreciation of the 
dollar. But U.S. interest rates had a lot to do with it. The merchandise trade 
deficit grew from $21.7 billion in 1983:4 to $29.3 four quarters later, the cur- 
rent account deficit from $18.3 to $30.0. Reversal of the deterioration proved 
to be a slow and difficult process, even after the dollar’s exchange value fell. 
By  1980, economists inside and outside the Federal Reserve and the Trea- 
sury understood the qualitative  role of exchange rates, capital movements, and 
trade imbalances in the transmission of monetary measures-and  fiscal mea- 
sures too-to  the economy in a world of floating exchange rates and mobile 
financial funds. Qualitatively, things happened the way  our theory said they 
would. But I guess that no one, even in the Fed’s international shop, foresaw 
how large these effects could be, how long they could persist, and how difficult 
they might be to reverse. 
The drag of the import surplus was one reason that the recovery of real GNP 
proceeded even more slowly in the two years after 1984,3.6 percent in 1985 
and  1.9 in  1986, while unemployment hovered around 7.0 percent. Only in 
1987-88,  after the cautious easing of 1986 finally took effect, was the recovery 
completed, five and a half years after it had begun. 
Real interest rates averaged 400 or 500 basis points higher in the  1980s 
recovery than in previous postwar expansions. This is the proximate cause of 
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tom of  others. Like most people in this room, I place most of  the blame on 
federal fiscal policy. But the Fed could have lowered rates sooner and further 
in the period 1984-87. 
I tell monetary policy skeptics like my friend Bob Eisner that we could have 
had-indeed,  we would have had-the  same recovery in the 1980s without the 
extraordinary fiscal stimulus, the same performance in GNP and employment 
without the negative by-products. I have based this claim on the generous inter- 
pretation of Fed policy that I have given above. Assuming that the Fed’s targets 
for macroeconomic performance would have been the same had fiscal policy 
been pre-Reagan normal, I say that the Fed had plenty of room to lower interest 
rates in pursuit of those targets and would have used it. Maybe, in fact, sound 
fiscal policy would have made the Fed more expansionary. Maybe our central 
bankers held back at times in hopes of sending a message about fiscal policy 
to the president and Congress. 
I am still saying these things, now  to people who wony whether budget 
correction will cause recession. I hope I am right. The Fed might have to act 
faster, in larger steps, than they did in 1984-86.  Twenty-five basis points every 
FOMC meeting would not be enough. 
Sometimes, I am afraid, defense of the dollar has been given more weight 
than it deserves. I am not refemng to the fall of  1979, when Paul tells us that 
the dollar’s weakness and the complaints of major foreign central bankers sim- 
ply reinforced the sufficient domestic reasons for a contractionary move. But 
supporting the dollar was a consideration in 1984 and again after the Group of 
Five agreed at the Louvre in early 1987 that the 1985-86  depreciation had 
gone far enough. (According to Paul, this was Treasury policy, not his prefer- 
ence. The idea that exchange rate policy is the province of the Treasury and 
that monetary policy is the province of the Federal Reserve seems dangerously 
anomalous, given that the two  policies are essentially one and the same.) Inter- 
est rates to support the dollar contributed to the slowdown in 1987 and perhaps 
to the stock market crash in October. Following the crash, Greenspan and his 
colleagues eased decisively and let the dollar fall, with good macroeconomic 
results. 
Dollar defense may be a consideration again now, when domestic demand 
expansions and tight monetary policies are raising interest rates in Japan and 
Europe. I see no good reason to oppose a depreciation of the dollar when lower 
interest rates are appropriate to domestic demand management, particularly 
when there is room in the economy for more net exports. How will we get the 
capital inflow that we need to “finance” our trade deficit if  our interest rates 
are lower than those overseas? If it takes a dollar low enough to make investors 
around the world believe that it is going to rise, so be it. 
As early as the spring of  1982, I suggested a tripartite accord-White 
House, Congress, and Fed-to  shift the policy mix to tighter budget and easier 
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Summary of Discussion 
Paul  Volcker began the discussion by  responding to several points made by 
Tobin. First, he addressed the extent to which the Federal Reserve worries 
about financial markets as well as about the economy. He thought that most 
people at the Fed focus on the economy, although in 1982 he had persuaded 
them to start thinking about the financial system as well. He and the president 
of the New York Federal Reserve Bank had womed more about the financial 
markets than other people had. 
Next, Volcker agreed with Tobin that different members of the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) weigh various factors differently in choosing the 
appropriate monetary policy. This is why it is almost impossible to say what 
weights the Federal Reserve as a whole was giving to the money supply and to 
other indicators. Volcker thought that one reasen that the FOMC keeps re- 
turning to interest rate targeting, which is what they seemed to be doing again, 
is simply that the rest of the committee never completely trusts the chairman. 
With a money supply target, some members of the FOMC might be suspicious 
that the chairman would use the small amount of leeway he has in week-to- 
week operations to produce a slightly different result than they want. With a 
Federal funds rate target, this problem does not exist. 
Third, Volcker disagreed with Tobin’s judgment about the degree to which 
there had been a problem with monetary policy in 1984. The general mind-set 
at the Federal Reserve had been that the Fed historically made the mistake of 
tightening monetary policy too late in an expansion and was then forced to 
tighten too abruptly. Perhaps that background contributed to the Fed sticking 
to a tighter policy in the summer of  1984 longer than it really intended or, in 
retrospect, than it should have. The lending market turned out to be tighter 
than expected because banks were reluctant to lend to each other as freely as 
they had in the past, and the result was double-digit interest rates. During July 
and August, there was much disagreement on the FOMC about how to re- 
spond, if at all, and it was not until September, when the economy began to 
look shakier, that monetary policy was finally relaxed. 
Further, Volcker said that the Fed had paid attention to exchange rates in 
1985  and 1986 and that he did not think that that had been a mistake. He added 
that Japan and Germany were growing even more slowly than the United States 
during that period and that he had felt that the burden was on them to expand 
in the interest of the world economy. So he had devoted considerable effort to 
encouraging them to expand so that the United States would not have to take 
inappropriately strong expansionary action itself. 
Finally, Volcker remarked that he thought that there were signs that the Fed- 
eral Reserve was going back to attempts to fine-tune the economy, deliberately 
or not. 
Martin Feldstein asked whether the Federal Reserve expected a recession to 
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Volcker responded that the Federal Reserve staff (like many others) had been 
projecting a recession for a long time but that it had not yet materialized. Thus, 
he thought that there was some risk of one occurring but that he was not at all 
certain, as the economy seemed to be expanding despite the expectations and 
people seemed to be willing to borrow and lend. Volcker said that he knew 
that a recession would occur sooner or later, regardless of the short-term stance 
of  monetary policy, and that even now he is not sure whether the economy 
would have had a recession in March and April if credit controls had not been 
imposed. Volcker also noted that the White House had strongly urged (and 
authorized) the credit controls to make a political point as a supplement to the 
more traditional monetary restraint. 
Feldstein questioned whether it was a natural thing that the economy had 
turned around so quickly after the very sharp downturn in 1980. As Volcker 
had described it, the credit controls induced a drop in money demand so that 
interest rates fell automatically without any explicit action by the Fed. In re- 
sponse to lower interest rates, money demand increased, and the economy re- 
covered, with the Fed just a passive player. Volcker clarified that the Federal 
Reserve had taken the discretionary step of increasing nonborrowed reserves 
on several occasions. 
Feldstein asked how effective the 1979 “regime shift” had been in convinc- 
ing financial markets that the Federal Reserve was serious about reducing in- 
flation. 
Volcker believed that the outcome of the regime shift was not as favorable 
as he had expected or hoped. The Fed wanted to show banks that they did not 
have an inexhaustible supply of money, so they ought to take more care about 
the credit they were extending. This is the reason that the Fed put a special 
reserve requirement on time deposit accounts in October. Yet the policy was 
not as effective as hoped because of deep skepticism  in the market. One indica- 
tion was that people interpreted the fact that the Federal Reserve set monitor- 
ing ranges for the Federal funds rate as meaning that it was not really going to 
follow the new policy. Volcker added that this was why he was really not sure 
that there would have been a recession in March 1980 without the credit con- 
trols. 
William Niskanen  questioned the motivation of  the Carter administration 
when it asked the Federal Reserve to impose credit controls in March 1980. 
Charles Schultze replied that he had thought that the rationale for the policy 
was somewhat absurd. The Carter administration had been preparing an eco- 
nomic package that reduced the budget deficit by cutting social programs and 
encouraged the Fed to tighten monetary policy. But parts of the administration 
wanted a “liberal element” to combine with these conservative pieces, and the 
AFL-CIO was urging them to use credit controls to reduce the flow of credit 
without raising interest rates. So the Carter administration asked the Fed to 
impose the controls. Schultze added that no one had anticipated the public’s 
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was a 40 percent drop in the monthly sales of  big-ticket items. What was, 
objectively, a relatively mild penalty on consumer loans unexpectedly turned 
into a massive reduction in borrowing. 
Paul Krugmn  noted that, in the discussion of budget policy, both Stockman 
and Schultze concluded that the standard budget policy in the United States is 
essentially an equilibrating one but that there were unusual events at the begin- 
ning of  the  1980s  that changed matters. For monetary policy, most people 
would conclude that it normally has an inflationary bias, where the Federal 
Reserve fights recessions earnestly and responds to inflations somewhat late. 
But, in the early 1980s, monetary policy, like fiscal policy, was completely out 
of  character. Krugman wondered why  this  was possible.  One explanation 
might be the great intellectual confusion that was reigning in 1980. There was 
the monetaristlrational expectations belief, for example, that, if  you strongly 
announced your willingness to suffer pain, you would not actually have to suf- 
fer it. Monetarism also gave the Fed the ability to say that it was simply tar- 
geting monetary aggregates and not actually planning on a recession. 
Krugman also asked whether it was simply a “stealth tactic” for the Fed to 
use the trappings of monetarism to pursue an essentially orthodox disinfla- 
tionary policy. 
Volcker replied that he thought that monetarist theory had been important in 
shaping the monetary policy of the early 1980s, as the theory had gained re- 
spect from both the public and professionals. He thought that rational expecta- 
tions theory had been much less important. Most crucial to the shaping of 
monetary policy, however, was the fact that the general public was very upset 
when inflation rates were 14-15  percent, and they realized that it had some- 
thing to do with money. So they were more willing to tolerate measures to 
reduce inflation by reducing money growth than when inflation did not seem 
so troublesome. 
Volcker asserted strongly that applying monetarist theory had not been a 
stealth tactic. He believed that the Fed had used monetarism partly to discipline 
itself and partly to take advantage of the public support for such a policy. It 
was much easier to explain a monetarist policy to the public because he could 
point out that money is related to inflation, so that, in order to restrain inflation, 
the Fed needed to restrain the money supply. It seemed common sense that too 
much money meant too much inflation-people  had learned this in school and 
had read it in the daily press. Volcker felt that it had been a very simple mes- 
sage, important to the explanation and support of policy. 
James Tobin stressed Krugman’s question about the extent to which the Fed- 
eral Open Market Committee had been influenced by the rational expectations/ 
monetarist doctrine in the late 1970s and afterward. The theory says that, by 
making a credible threat that there will be pain and suffering about which the 
Fed will do nothing, the Fed can accelerate disinflation without as much pain 
and suffering. Had this theory been significant in the shift in policy during the 
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Volcker responded that there had been a hope that the theory would work in 
a general way, but certainly no faith in the more extreme formulations. There 
was a view that, if the Fed was credible enough, then short-term interest rates 
might go up, but long-term rates would remain stable or even go down because 
everyone had so much faith in the new, powerful anti-inflation program. In fact, 
however, long-term rates went up. 
William Poole said that one of the puzzles from the period 1979-82  is why 
both long- and short-term interest rates were so volatile. One answer could be 
that the markets did not gain confidence in the Federal Reserve’s conviction to 
stick with its policy until the economy had suffered a considerable  way through 
the recession. But Poole did not believe that this explanation  completely solves 
the puzzle about why long rates were so volatile and followed short rates so 
closely. 
SchuZtze commented that perhaps Volcker sold himself a little short by deny- 
ing the use of stealth in 1979. Schultze said that Volcker had been right, and 
that he and William Miller [chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 1978-791 
had been wrong, about the tactic to be used when radically changing the stance 
of monetary policy. For twenty-five years, the public had perceived the Fed as 
sitting around deciding what interest rates were going to be the next month, 
and the politicians saw the Fed as directly responsible for every quarter of  a 
percent rise in rates. In 1979, the Fed had to make massive moves in interest 
rates, which would have been impossible had they tried to do it directly. Now 
that the Fed no longer has to move interest rates a lot, they can go back to 
targeting them. 
Volcker responded that the Federal Open Market Committee really had no 
idea that interest rates were going to rise to 19 percent. It was not as though 
they  decided that they wanted interest rates to go  19 percent and just an- 
nounced the money supply figure that they knew was going to result in those 
rates. Volcker had known that interest rates were going to go up, but, had he 
known in advance that they would increase so much, he did not think that he 
would have been able to convince the committee, or perhaps himself, to imple- 
ment the same policy. He emphasized this point because he did not think that 
the Federal Reserve can survive as an institution if people become convinced 
that things are done by stealth. He felt that it is very dangerous for any institu- 
tion that depends on people’s confidence to adopt policies on the basis that 
they will fool people. He regretted the confusion on this point that had been 
sown by later comments of some on the Open Market Committee itself. 
Feldstein repeated Tobin’s statement that at some point the Federal Reserve 
had stopped targeting the monetary aggregates and had made the true target 
nominal GNP and the operating target the Federal funds rate. He asked Volcker 
if this were true. 
Volcker replied that, as the chairman, he had looked at both the economy 
and the money supply figures and, as he had mentioned earlier, also at the 
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thought that the real shift in the operating target was in October 1982, when 
the Fed switched from total nonborrowed reserves to marginal borrowing. As 
time passed, there was a lot of debate in the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) between those who wanted to target interest rates directly and those 
who wanted to stick with borrowing. People may say that it amounts to the 
same thing because there is obviously a close relation, but it is not a perfect 
relation, and at times the two targets imply different operational approaches. 
Volcker added that he had opposed returning to interest rate targeting be- 
cause it induces a great reluctance to adjust policy, as Schultze said. When one 
is aiming directly at interest rates, it becomes a great decision to change them 
by a quarter of a percent, so, to avoid this inertia, Volcker did not want to target 
interest rates directly. Volcker said that it appears as though the Fed has gone 
back to targeting interest rates directly and that this has in fact created more in- 
ertia. 
Volcker then addressed the issue of  whether real GNP was the Fed’s true 
target. He said that he was never confident that there was a close relation be- 
tween Fed policy and nominal or real GNP over relevant time periods for oper- 
ational decisions. So, even though he monitored the acceleration or decelera- 
tion of GNP, it was really very hard to target as a short-term operational matter. 
Volcker noted that the GNP numbers in the semiannual FOMC reports that 
Tobin mentioned were really projections, not targets. 
Tibin pointed out that it seems logical to interpret those projections as im- 
plicit targets, given that they come from “the pilot of the boat.” He went on to 
say that he did not mean to imply that the Fed was using real GNP as the target 
in any long-run sense but only that the Fed probably thinks of the economy 
in the old-fashioned terms of  slack and catch-up in relation to normal full- 
employment growth. He noted that, although there are many economists in the 
world today who do not think of the economy in those terms, he thought that 
this is how the Fed was thinking of it during that period. So they based their 
real GNP goals on the implications for full employment as well as for inflation 
and the many other phenomena of concern. 
Feldstein added that the Fed’s nominal GNP projections seemed to be more 
or less consistent with traditional velocity relations and the Fed’s monetary 
targets. Further, these nominal GNP projections were in line with the real 
GNPhflation breakdowns forecast by  the Fed. This suggests that, although 
the Fed may not literally have had nominal GNP targets, it did have a sense of 
the levels of nominal GNP, real GNP, and inflation that were consistent with 
its monetary policy. It seems as though the level of nominal GNP really was a 
central factor. 
Volcker stated that the projections presented were not a set of forecasts that 
had been debated. They were the independent projections of nineteen voting 
and nonvoting members of  the Federal Open Market Committee collected 
before the meetings, and the projections rarely changed after the meetings. 
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then added them up to get nominal GNP. Occasionally, these projections of 
nominal GNP implied unusual velocity behavior when combined with the 
monetary targets, but the implied velocity was never completely unrealistic. 
Fred Bergsten responded that, despite Volcker’s description of  the FOMC 
meetings, people have found a closer correlation of monetary policy with nom- 
inal GNP than with anything else. 
Geoffrey Carliner asked how important President Reagan’s support had been 
to the Fed in its efforts to fight inflation in 1981 and early 1982. He also won- 
dered whether the Fed would have received similar support from President 
Carter. 
Volcker said that he thought that the Federal Reserve had received fairly 
good support from Carter. Despite the surge in interest rates, Carter mentioned 
monetary policy only once during the 1980  campaign. The Reagan administra- 
tion was very monetarist and did not care about interest rates, and it encour- 
aged the Fed to pursue tight money in early 1981. The economy continued to 
grow for a while despite the very high interest rates, but, when the recession 
finally  occurred, the  administration stopped encouraging the  restraint on 
money, and a certain amount of sniping developed. Volcker said that he thought 
that there were probably many people in the White House and at the Treasury 
who tried to get President Reagan to criticize the Federal Reserve at that point 
but that Reagan would not say anything bad about an anti-inflationary policy, 
which was important. 
Feldstein agreed that there were many people within the administration  who 
were taking every opportunity to criticize the Fed in 1983 and 1984, especially 
as more and more private forecasters were predicting another recession. Never- 
theless, President Reagan often took the opportunity at news conferences to 
say that he was supporting the Fed. 
Volcker added that, in his view, the most important single action of the ad- 
ministration in helping the anti-inflation fight was defeating the air traffic con- 
trollers’ strike. He thought that this action had had a rather profound, and, 
from his standpoint, constructive, effect on the climate of labor-management 
relations, even though it had not been a wage issue at the time. 
Charls Walker asked the role of the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks 
in making policy. He wondered in particular whether they had supported or 
hindered Volcker’s efforts from 1980 to 1982. 
Volcker said that there had been a very harmonious board during that period. 
People knew each other well and did not have very divergent views. Without 
question, however, the most monetarist people were some of the bank presi- 
dents. So Volcker said that he instinctively knew that many of the bank presi- 
dents would be enthusiastic over the new policy because they had at times in 
the past promoted something like that themselves. 
Volcker also remarked that, although he received supportive comments on 
monetary policy from the administration, their statements emphasized a grad- 
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the money supply gradually and expect that the economy would suffer no ad- 
verse effects. The Fed could not control the money supply that closely. Thus, 
Volcker tried to remove the word gradual from all statements after 1979. 
Bergsten opened the subject of how external factors like the dollar had in- 
fluenced Volcker’s monetary policy. Although Tobin criticized Volcker for pay- 
ing too much attention to the dollar, Bergsten thought that he had emphasized 
it much less than in the popular political view. In particular, Bergsten wondered 
about the role of external factors in Volcker’s 1979 decision. The dollar had 
fallen sharply in late 1978 and remained precarious in 1979, and Volcker re- 
turned from the IMF meeting in Belgrade more quickly than had been sched- 
uled. Had international events been, although not the cause of  Volcker’s deci- 
sion, the trigger for deciding to move at that point? 
Bergsten also asked about the role of external factors in 1982 when the Fed 
stopped targeting the monetary aggregates and went back to interest rate tar- 
geting. Some people suggested that the timing trigger had been the Mexico 
debt crisis because of its implications for the U.S. banking system. 
Volcker said that the weakness of the dollar in 1979 had been just one factor 
in the whole inflationary expectationsflack  of credibility picture. He had talked 
with some of his central banking colleagues at the Belgrade meeting to see 
how they would react to a strongly anti-inflationary monetary policy, and they 
had encouraged him. But he had returned from Belgrade not because of any 
great urgency caused by the meeting but because he felt that he should be back 
to work on this program. Even more important than the Belgrade meeting itself 
was a meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt during a stopover 
on the return flight. Schmidt had said that the U.S. economy was in trouble 
and that inflation was out of  control. Shortly before that, Volcker had told 
Schultze and William Miller about the monetary policy he was considering, 
and the Schmidt visit may have been important in reinforcing the sense of 
urgency. 
As for the change in policy in 1982, Volcker noted that the first signals of 
easing were in July, before the Mexican debt crisis erupted in the open. He did 
think that the precariousness of  the international situation had been a factor 
but that domestic financial concerns had played a more important role. 
On a related topic, Poole pointed out that the Plaza Agreement had commit- 
ted the U.S. government to depreciate the exchange rate, requiring that interest 
rates be kept low.  He felt that this had put a constraint on what the Federal 
Reserve could do. The market understood this constraint and took it as a signal 
that monetary policy was going to be biased in an easier direction than would 
otherwise have been the case. 
Volcker recalled that he did discuss monetary policy with the secretary of 
the Treasury at the time of the Plaza Agreement but that, since he had thought 
that there was no reasonable prospect that the Fed would be tightening mone- 
tary policy for some months anyway, he had supported the agreement. Volcker 
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decision making, his discussion with the secretary of Treasury would have 
been different. 
Feldstein asked if similar concerns were raised around the time of the Lou- 
vre Agreement and the period thereafter. Volcker  said that there must have been 
some discussion at the time but that he did not remember it, probably because 
it had not been a problem. It had not been discussed at the Louvre itself. 
Feldstein then asked why the Treasury changed its policy regarding the ex- 
change rate between 1985 and 1987. In 1985, the Treasury seemed eager to 
push the value of the dollar down, whereas, in  1987, it wanted to keep the 
dollar from declining any further. He wondered how much the decision to stop 
the dollar from declining was due to Volcker’s concerns about an increase in in- 
flation. 
Volcker said that, under Secretary Don Regan, the Treasury Department had 
taken it as a badge of national honor that the value of the dollar was high. They 
did not want to intervene, no matter how high the dollar climbed. On the other 
hand, Treasury Secretary James Baker and Deputy Secretary Richard Darman 
seemed to dislike the large trade deficit, and they were particularly concerned 
about the increasing protectionist pressures in Congress. Volcker thought that 
this concern was really what had triggered the Plaza Agreement. 
As for the decision to stop the decline of the dollar in 1987, Volcker said 
that the Treasury was certainly aware of his concerns about inflation and more 
pointedly than about the implications of a continuing fall in the dollar. He 
thought that the Treasury had already become somewhat concerned about the 
implications of further dollar decline. Also, the Treasury was concerned about 
international cooperation from Japan, which it wanted to undertake an expan- 
sionary fiscal policy. 